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Report of the Canadian delegate to
the conference ...

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CONFERENCE
ON
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

HELD AT

LONDON

JANUARY 21, 1930, TO APRIL 22, 1930

REPORT OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATE

WITH

ANNEXES



OTTAWA
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1930

CONFERENCE
ON
LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT



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CONFERENCE ON THE LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT

HELD AT

LONDON

FROM JANUARY 21, 1930, TO APRIL 22, 1930

REPORT OF THE HON. J. L. RALSTON, C.M.G., D.S.O., K.C.,
CANADIAN DELEGATE

SIR,—I have the honour to submit the following Report on the proceedings of the Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armament, known as The London Naval Conference, which was held in London from January 21 to April 22, 1930.

1. This Conference should not be considered as an isolated event, but rather as the latest of a series of developments designed to bring about the progressive reduction of armaments as a step on the road to world peace. In one sense it may be true that the recent Conference may be considered as the continuation of the Washington Conference of 1921. Indeed, both the invitation to the Conference and the Treaty resulting from it, acknowledge this connection. But the London Conference has a wider significance than this. It is a definite part of a general and widespread movement arising out of the catastrophe of the Great War, which has for its end the maintenance of peace and as one of the means to that end, the abolition of the instruments of war. In this light, then, the recent Conference must be considered as a phase, a very important phase, of this wider movement. Especially must it be considered as a part of the disarmament work of the League of Nations. Certain delegations at the Conference, particularly the French, emphasized repeatedly this interdependence of the work of the London Conference and that of the League Preparatory Disarmament Commission, and the close connection of the principles underlying the movement for naval disarmament with those looking to land and air disarmament.

2. The London Conference is also related to other attempts to reduce armaments in recent years. There was, for instance, the Three Power Geneva Conference of 1927. This, it is true, failed to reach an agreement, but its very failure raised the fear that unless something were done, the Powers would drift into a competition of naval armament with the inevitable and disastrous consequences which have always resulted from such competitions in the past. There was also the so-called Anglo-French compromise of 1928—an attempt to remove certain obstacles which prevented the Powers concerned from co-operating to the fullest extent in the work of reducing armaments. Its failure merely threw into even bolder relief the necessity for ultimate success, and proved, if such proof was necessary, that this success could only be attained through the co-operation of all the principal Powers. And then in September,

1928, the signing in Paris of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, which outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, gave a tremendous impetus to the work of disarmament and provided a definite written basis for that work. So much for the general background.

3. The more immediate steps leading up to the late Conference may be said to have begun with the inauguration of Mr. Hoover as President of the United States and the return of the Labour Government to power in England, under the Rt. Hon. J. Ramsay MacDonald as Prime Minister; both in the spring of 1929. Shortly after his accession to office, Mr. Hoover, speaking through Ambassador Gibson at the April session of the League Preparatory Disarmament Commission, stated that he regarded the Peace Pact as henceforth the dominant factor in disarmament discussions, and that while his country still adhered to the principle of "relative needs" and "limitation by categories," he was willing to discuss any methods of meeting the special requirements of other Powers, either by transference or by more elastic formulae for evaluating naval units. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald immediately on becoming Prime Minister initiated conversations with the United States designed to remove the obstacles in the way of an agreement on naval reduction between the two countries, and to clear the way for the holding of a naval conference, at once, instead of in 1931 as provided for in the Washington Treaty. These conversations,* of which Japan, France, Italy and the British Dominions were kept informed, and to the principle of which they voiced no objection, had such a satisfactory result that on October 7, 1929, Mr. MacDonald felt justified in issuing formal invitations to all of the Powers mentioned above to attend an international conference on the limitation of naval armament, which it was proposed to hold in London early in 1930. On Sept. 28th the British Prime Minister had left England on his memorable visit to Canada and the United States. On his return to England he further carried on the work of preparation by an exchange of views with the Governments of France, Italy and Japan, an exchange which he had already emphasized as essential before any conference should meet. Indeed, Mr. MacDonald in his speech delivered in Ottawa in October, 1929, had declared that on his return to London he would carry on these conversations with the other Powers in the same frank, free and open way that had characterized the conversations between the United States and the United Kingdom, recognizing that the world was not merely the above two countries.

4. The British note of invitation** suggested that the Conference should be summoned for January 21, 1930, to consider categories not covered by the Washington Treaty, and to deal with questions covered by the second paragraph of that Treaty. The invitation emphasized especially three facts:

- (1) that the Briand-Kellogg Pact was regarded as the starting point for any agreement;
- (2) that so far as the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations was concerned, the principle of parity in all categories to be reached by the 31st December, 1936, had been accepted;
- (3) that the forthcoming Conference was directly related to the disarmament work of the League of Nations, and there was no intention in the summoning of this Conference to set up any new machinery to deal with naval disarmament questions, but rather to facilitate the task of the League and of the subsequent general disarmament Conference to be held under its auspices.

5. The invitations to the Conference were accepted by all the Powers to whom they were transmitted. The United States' note of acceptance emphasized the fact that the forthcoming Conference would continue the work begun in Wash-

* For the Report of these Conversations, see Annex C.

** Annex B.

ingon. The Japanese reply stated, among other things, that Japan would claim at the Conference a 70 per cent ratio in auxiliary craft with the strongest naval Power. The French stressed the view that naval disarmament could not logically be considered apart from land and air disarmament, and suggested that the express object of the Conference should be to facilitate the disarmament work of the League of Nations. Finally, the Italian reply emphasized the preference of that Government for limitation by global tonnage rather than by categories, and expressed a willingness to reduce its navy to the lowest possible figure, provided it was not exceeded by that of any other Power on the continent of Europe.

6. On the acceptance of the invitations the conversations between the Powers were continued and further preparatory work was successfully accomplished. The governments exchanged views fully and freely before the Conference assembled, and various official pronouncements were made as to their attitude towards the problems to be solved.

7. The Conference was opened on January 21. The participating Powers were represented by the following delegates:—

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

- The Honourable Henry L. Stimson
Secretary of State.
- The Honourable Charles G. Dawes, C.B.,
Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
- The Honourable Charles F. Adams,
Secretary of the Navy.
- The Honourable Joseph T. Robinson,
United States Senator.
- The Honourable David A. Reed,
United States Senator.
- The Honourable Hugh S. Gibson,
United States Ambassador to Belgium.
- The Honourable Dwight W. Morrow,
United States Ambassador to Mexico.

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

- The Honourable J. E. Fenton, M.P.,
Minister for Trade and Customs.

CANADA

- The Honourable J. L. Ralston, C.M.G., D.S.O., K.C.,
Minister for National Defence.
- The Honourable Philippe Roy,
Canadian Minister in Paris.

(From April 11 till April 22)

FRANCE

- M. André Tardieu,
Président du Conseil, Ministre de l'Intérieur.
- M. Aristide Briand,
Ministre des Affaires étrangères.
- M. Georges Leygues,
Ministre de la Marine.

M. François Pietri,
Ministre des Colonies.
M. Aimé de Fleuriau, G.C.V.O.,
Ambassadeur de France à Londres.

GREAT BRITAIN

The Right Honourable J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.,
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.
The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Honourable W. Wedgwood Benn, D.S.O., D.F.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for India.
The Right Honourable A. V. Alexander, M.P.,
First Lord of the Admiralty.

INDIA

Sir Atul C. Chatterjee, K.C.I.E.,
High Commissioner for India in London.

IRISH FREE STATE

Professor T. A. Smiddy,
High Commissioner for the Irish Free State in London.

ITALY

The Honourable Dino Grandi,
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Admiral of Division Guiseppe Sirianni,
Minister of Marine.
Antonio Chiamonte-Bordonaro,
His Majesty's Ambassador to the Court of St. James.
Admiral of the Fleet Barone Alfredo Acton,
Senator of the Realm.

JAPAN

Mr. Reiji Wakatsuki,
Member of the House of Peers.
Admiral Takeshi Takarabe,
Minister of Marine.
Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Court of
St. James.
Mr. Matsuzo Nagai,
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at Brussels.

NEW ZEALAND

Mr. T. M. Wilford, K.C.,
High Commissioner for New Zealand in London.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. C. T. de Water,
High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

CANADIAN STAFF

8. The Canadian delegate was assisted by the following staff:—

EXPERT ADVISERS

Commodore Walter Hose, C.B.E., R.C.N.,
Chief of Naval Staff, Canada.

Mr. L. B. Pearson,
First Secretary, Department of External Affairs, Ottawa.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. P. Vanier, D.S.O., M.C.,
Member of the League of Nations Permanent Advisory Commission for Military, Naval and Air Questions.

Major G. H. Brown, Secretary.

9. Parliamentary duties necessitated my return to Canada on April 11th before the end of the Conference, and the Honourable Philippe Roy, Canadian Minister in Paris took over the duties of Canadian delegate on that date.

A list of the Members of the other Commonwealth delegations is attached to this Report.*

THE DOMINIONS AT THE CONFERENCE

10. Possibly a word might be said at this point on the position of the Dominions at the Conference. Each of the Dominions and India received a separate invitation to the Conference; each signed the Treaty as a separate High Contracting Party.

11. It should be emphasized, however, that throughout the Conference His Majesty's seven delegations worked together in closest harmony and co-operated in every way to attain those ends for which it was summoned. Such co-operation was especially desirable in the case of a naval limitation conference because the members of the Commonwealth had agreed to aggregate their naval forces and to accept any total tonnage figures that might result from the Conference as representing, so far as the Commonwealth was concerned, total collective strengths. To insure this co-operation, continual consultation among the Commonwealth delegations took place and numerous conferences were held. There were, indeed, twenty-four meetings of the Commonwealth delegations or heads of delegations held during the Conference to discuss the various problems as they arose. There were, in addition, numerous informal Commonwealth conversations. Mr. MacDonald made the following reference to the Dominions in his closing speech:—

“Around the British Government,” he said, “has been ranged a body of independent representatives of the Dominions and India who, whilst guarding with jealous care their independent position, have shown a sleepless anxiety to maintain that unity and counsel which was necessary for general agreement.”

THE OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE

12. The Conference was signally honoured by the presence of His Majesty the King at the first plenary session in the Royal Gallery of the House of Lords. His eloquent words in opening the Conference made a deep and lasting impression on all the delegations. It seems fitting to quote them in full at this point:

“It is with sincere satisfaction that I am present here to welcome the delegates of the five principal Naval Powers assembled with the object of eliminating the evil results of wasteful competition in naval armaments.

* Annex D.

"Every nation represented here is proud of its navy, proud of that navy's past achievements and inspiring traditions. It is not the fault of these traditions, nor of our navies, if competition in naval construction, due to the supposed necessities of policy, has led to a feeling of insecurity between nations and even to the risk of war. Since the Great War all peoples have determined that human statecraft shall leave nothing undone to prevent a repetition of that grim and immense tragedy. In the edifice of peace which we are seeking to build, one of its most important columns is agreement between maritime nations on the limitation of naval strength and a reduction to a point consistent with national security.

"The practical application of the principle of reduction of naval armaments has, in the past, proved a matter of supreme difficulty. A great success was achieved in the conclusion of the Washington Treaty in 1922 imposing certain limitations on the construction of the capital ship and the aircraft carrier, but hitherto all efforts to advance beyond that point have failed.

"I believe that you, to whom your Governments have entrusted the high mission of continuing the task begun at Washington, are animated with the single-minded intention of working, not with any selfish and exclusively nationalistic purpose, but with the noble inspiration and resolve to remove once and for all this particular obstacle from the path of order and civilized progress.

"All nations have varying needs demanding special consideration, but if each is equally determined to make some sacrifice as a contribution to the common good, I feel sure that your deliberations will confer a great and lasting benefit, not only upon the countries which you represent, but upon mankind generally.

"I earnestly trust that the results of this Conference will lead to immediate alleviation of the heavy burden of armaments now weighing upon the peoples of the world, and also, by facilitating the future work of the League Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, hasten the time when a general disarmament conference can deal with this problem in an even more comprehensive manner. In this hope I shall follow your deliberations with the closest interest and attention."

These noble sentiments were echoed by the other eleven delegates who spoke at the first meeting, all of whom expressed the fervent desire of their governments and peoples that the Conference should succeed.

13. The speech of the Canadian delegate is attached to this Report as Appendix E.

ORGANISATION AND PROCEDURE

14. At the first plenary session, on the motion of Mr. Stimson seconded by M. Tardieu, Mr. MacDonald, as head of the United Kingdom delegation was elected Chairman of the Conference. It was also decided that in the absence of the Chairman, the heads of the foreign delegations chosen in turn in alphabetical order, should preside. At the second plenary session Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., K.C.B., was chosen Secretary General. Sir Maurice himself, and the Secretariat which he organized and directed, carried out their arduous and difficult duties in a most efficient and satisfactory manner. It is not too much to say, indeed it was said more than once during the Conference, that no small part of its success was due to the work of the Secretary General and his associates.

15. It was agreed that for the purpose of dealing with the work before it, the Conference should have two types of meetings. First there would be the formal plenary sessions held, primarily, to give final effect to decisions of Committees,

and, for the purpose of making public statements. There were only six of these sessions for it was felt that they should be as few as possible so that there would be more time available for the real work which could only be done through committees, sub-committees and private conversations. Secondly, there was appointed the First Committee, which was, in principle, a Committee of the whole consisting of all the delegates, though in practice only one or two from each delegation attended or took part in the actual deliberations. This Committee, over which the First Lord of the Admiralty, Mr. Alexander, presided, was constituted by a Resolution of the third plenary session as follows:

“Resolved, that the questions of method and procedure included under the heading entitled ‘General Questions’ in the Agenda now under discussion by the Chiefs of Delegations, and including particularly the suggestions of the French and British Governments as to limitation by global tonnage or by categories respectively, and including methods of transfer suggested by the French Government, be referred to a Committee, composed of representatives to be appointed by the Delegations represented in the Conference, with directions to examine carefully the possibilities and probable effect of said methods with reference to the fleets of said respective nations and to report its views thereon to the Conference through the Chiefs of the respective Delegations.”

16. Work was also carried on in smaller gatherings. There were informal meetings of the Heads of Delegations to review the work to be accomplished from day to day, solve difficulties and to refer matters on the Agenda to the Committee. Parallel to these Heads of Delegations meetings there were numerous conferences, discussions and conversations between members of the various delegations. It was through these informal meetings and conversations that probably the most important work of the Conference was done. Certainly they constituted the only practical way by which the various delegates could achieve the requisite appreciation of the conditions and views of the other countries represented, and thus arrive at a final solution which might be just and fair to all.

17. There were also legal and technical sub-committees appointed to deal with specialized questions as they arose, the personnel of which was determined when the sub-committee was appointed, and in the light of the objects for which it was constituted.

PUBLICITY

18. One of the most important questions that come before the Conference was that of the publicity which should be accorded its deliberations. The importance of this will be appreciated when it is remembered that there were 270 press units from many parts of the world commissioned to report the daily happenings at St. James's Palace, where the meetings of the Conference took place. The roll of journalists attending the Conference read as follows: British 111, Dominion and Colonial 40, United States 109, French 49, Japanese 12, Italian 11, German 28 and, from other countries, 54. In all the press of 34 nations reported the Conference. The question of publicity was, then, obviously of great importance, and it spoke much for the efficiency of that section of the British Foreign Office concerned that it was handled so satisfactorily. The plenary sessions were, of course, held in public and were fully reported. The Heads of Delegations and the First Committee, however, met in private. It was arranged that at the end of each private sitting, an official communiqué should be issued to the press, and that the Secretary General should be charged with the duty of seeing that any such

communiqué should first be approved by the representatives of all the delegations present. It was also agreed that though the delegates should not be asked to regard the above communiqué as imposing upon them the duty of absolute silence to the press, yet when making their own communications with their press, they should observe the official communiqué as determining the lines and the spirit of such communications. The world-wide transmission of speeches by wireless, both in the sessions of the Conference itself and in special messages from the delegates of the various countries, still further widened the field of publicity. Probably no international gathering has ever been held before whose work from day to day was so quickly, so completely and at the same time so intimately made known to the four corners of the world.

AGENDA

19. The technical problems involved in Naval Limitation which had to be faced by the Conference were, thanks to the various conferences which had been held on the subject in the last few years, fairly well known, and consequently but little preliminary work was necessary in preparing an Agenda which covered them.

20. This Agenda, as finally approved by the Heads of Delegations on January 28 is given below. All the subjects on it were discussed except II (7) "Merchant Ships and Merchant Ships Converted into Warships."

I. GENERAL QUESTIONS

France

- (1) The system of global tonnage?
The French Delegation's transactional proposals.
- (2) What classification is to be adopted?
- (3) Transfer—the amount and conditions thereof?

Great Britain

The system of limitation by categories.

Italy

- (1) Determination of Ratios.
- (2) Determination of the levels of the total tonnage of the several countries.

II. SPECIAL QUESTIONS

A. Classes of Ship not Regulated by the Washington Treaty.

- (1) "*Cruisers*"—8-inch gun type.
 - (a) What is to be the gross tonnage of each nation?
 - (b) What is the maximum tonnage of each individual ship?
 - (c) What numbers does each country require?
 - (d) What should be the life?
- (2) "*Cruisers*"—6-inch type.
 - (a) What is to be the gross tonnage of each nation?
 - (b) What is the maximum tonnage of the individual ship?
 - (c) What numbers does each country require?
 - (d) What should be the life?

(3) "*Submarines*,"

- (a) What should be the total tonnage?
- (b) What should be the characteristics, i.e. the size and gun limits?
- (c) What should be the life?
- (d) Use against merchant ships?

(4) "*Destroyers*."

- (a) What should be the total tonnage?
- (b) What should be their characteristics, i.e. the size and gun limits?
- (c) What should be the life?

(5) "*The Exempt Category*."

What should be the characteristics of this category?

(6) "*Special Vessels*" (Including vessels past the age limit.)(7) "*Merchant Ships and Merchant Ships Converted into Warships*."

Arrangement as to the limitation of guns and aeronautical equipments.

The Washington Treaty Categories.(1) "*Capital Ships*."

- (a) Should the holiday in construction be extended?
- (b) Should the numbers fixed at Washington be reduced?
- (c) Should the calibre of the gun be reduced?
- (d) Should the age be lengthened?
- (e) Should the tonnage of the individual ship be reduced?
- (f) The question of prolongation of replacement period.

(2) "*Aircraft Carriers*."

- (a) What are to be the characteristics of Carriers, e.g., tonnage, age, size, gun limits, etc.?
- (b) What should be their life?
- (c) Arrangement as to limitation of Aircraft Carriers of and under 10,000 tons.

21, When the Conference, its organization completed, its procedure adopted, and its agenda drawn up, confronted the problem before it, it realized, as indeed its members must have even previously realized, that the nature of that problem was two-fold. There was a technical problem and a political problem. The former could be left to the First Committee and sub-Committees, but the latter could only be dealt with by the Heads of Delegations in small and informal meetings. It might be well in this Report to consider these two aspects of the problem separately, though it must be recognized that any hard and fast division is impossible. The technical questions often had a political interest and the political questions were often technical in form. An attempt, however, to keep the two separate, in the interests of clarity, will be made.

PART I

TECHNICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON WARSHIP CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS
OF LIMITATION

22. First then, the technical problem. This was left primarily to the First Committee and the sub-Committees of experts appointed by it. A tremendous amount of valuable work was accomplished; work the results of which do not all appear in the Treaty but which will be of great assistance to any future general disarmament conference.

23. From the beginning, the Italian delegation felt that the two points in Part I of the agenda submitted by them, e.g. the questions of ratios and total tonnages, should be dealt with first as they raised a question of principle, e.g. the determination of the general principles and the political criteria of disarmament, while the other four points were concerned with matters of method and procedure. The consensus of opinion, however, was that these questions of method should be approached first. Signor Grandi, therefore, conceded the point in the following statement made at the Third Plenary Session, which embodied what came to be known as the Italian general reservation. Signor Grandi said:—

“As we are all agreed that the two points shall remain on the Agenda of the Conference, I have no difficulty in accepting that the questions of method and procedure written on our agenda may be examined in the meantime. I must, however, state that, while the Italian Delegation is prepared to take part in the discussions of the above points, it does not see its way to committing itself on any of the questions of method or on any special point of the disarmament problem until the two fundamental questions of the determination of ratios and maximum levels of global tonnages have been settled.”

24. The following technical questions were dealt with by the First Committee, and later referred to the Heads of Delegations for approval.

(1) *Method of Limitation*

25. This question was referred to specifically in the Resolution setting up the First Committee and received immediate consideration. It would be as well here to explain the ideas of the Global System and the Category System of limitation respectively, in their original and strict sense. By the Global System all that was to be limited was the total, or world, tonnage of the fleet and freedom was given within the total tonnage to allocate any proportion to such types of vessels as might seem most desirable for the purposes of the country concerned. The contention of supporters of this system was that, while limitation of total armaments was admittedly necessary, the differing conditions of various countries called for freedom of decision as to the classes of vessels most suited to those conditions. By the Category System, classes of war vessels were to be strictly differentiated and not only was the total naval tonnage of each Power to be defined, but also the amount of tonnage in each class or category of ships. The proponents of the latter system contended that as the composition of one navy must take into account the composition of others, there would be uncertainty, suspicion, instability and friction resulting from the unknown factor arising from the adoption of the Global System, and that these evils would only be eliminated by means of more detailed limitation.

26. The protagonists of the Global principle were France and Italy, those of the Category principle (while they differed in the details) were the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan.

27. Various compromises and suggestions had been put forward regarding this vexed question of the "Method of Limitation of Naval Armaments" ever since the Spring of 1927, none of which were mutually satisfactory. Discussions and private conversations, particularly between the delegations of the British Commonwealth and of France, commenced immediately after the opening of the Conference and continued parallel with the consideration of the question by the First Committee, in accordance with the resolution above referred to.

28. There were two proposals before the Committee, one known as the French Transactional Proposal,* which was based on limitation by global tonnage with some right of transfer between certain classes, and a British proposal based on limitation by categories. Eventually, a method was accepted by four Powers, Italy maintaining its general reservation, on the following basis:

29. The global figure not to be exceeded by each power should be laid down; following which each should indicate, after an exchange of views with the other Powers, how it would allocate this global figure. This allocation would become part of any treaty or agreement. The categories established for this purpose were two-fold. For the British Commonwealth, the United States and Japan, they were five in number with a sub-category for cruisers, as follows:—

- (a) Capital ships.
- (b) Aircraft Carriers.
- (c) Cruisers.
 - (1) with guns of more than 6 inch calibre.
 - (2) with guns of 6 inch calibre or under.
- (d) Destroyers.
- (e) Submarines.

30. France and Italy, however, wished to include all surface craft carrying guns of 6 inch calibre, or under, in one category. Therefore, for these two States, the categories were somewhat different, as follows:—

- (a) Capital ships.
- (b) Cruisers with guns exceeding 6 inches.
- (c) Light surface vessels with guns not exceeding 6 inches.
- (d) Submarines.
- (e) Aircraft Carriers.

31. Unfortunately, owing to the reservations of certain delegations, one of which has been referred to above, this agreement on method of limitation, though embodied in the First Report of the First Committee,* could not be incorporated in the Treaty. It was, however, referred to the League of Nations in a letter attached to this Report,** and will undoubtedly be of assistance in the forthcoming general Disarmament Conference.

(b) The Question of Transfer.

32. This was closely connected with the preceding subject. In brief, transfer is a method designed to reconcile the adherents of global limitation to the theory of limitation by categories by arranging for a certain elasticity in tonnage allocation. This could be achieved, it was hoped, by allowing a Power to move or to transfer a certain agreed percentage of the tonnage permitted in

* Annex I.

** Annex G.

one category into the category immediately above or below. As the Report of the First Committee on Methods of Limitation was not included in the Treaty, and as France and Italy did not enter into any agreement on programs with the other Powers, the question of transfer did not directly concern them. So far as the United States and the Commonwealth were concerned they were opposed to the principle of transfer but were willing, as a concession, to admit it in certain categories to a limited extent. Japan, however, had from the first attached importance in the method of limitation and classification to the principle of transfer being admitted between the light cruiser, destroyer and submarine classes. As regards transfer from these first two classes into submarines, Japan was unable to secure the concurrence of the other delegations and was content to allow its views on this matter to be recorded and to reserve the right to reassert its position thereto in the future. As for the light cruiser and destroyer categories, an agreement was reached which became Article XVII of the Treaty, permitting a transfer not exceeding 10 per cent between these two classes.

(3) *Special Vessels and Vessels Exempt from Limitation.*

33. These questions were referred to a sub-Committee of Experts by the First Committee. Difficulties were, however, encountered in considering them, which necessitated referring certain matters back to the Heads of Delegations. The French, for instance, differed with the other delegations in desiring to include special vessels in the total global tonnage, which would thereby allow them to be replaced as they became obsolete. The other delegations desired to put them in a special category with no replacement so that the class of special vessels should eventually die out. The question of the replacement of five existing Japanese vessels used for training purposes also caused some discussion. Eventually, however, an agreement on exempt and special vessels was reached, incorporated in the second Report of the First Committee and, as it was accepted by all the powers, forms the basis of Articles 3, 4, 5, 8 and 12 of the Treaty.

(4) *Submarines.*

34. The subject of submarines was placed as Item 3 on the Agenda. First, however, the question of their abolition was taken up by the full Conference at its fourth plenary session. The British Commonwealth and the United States supported such abolition as an important advance towards reduction of armaments, but France and Japan opposed it on the grounds that the submarine was a legitimate defensive weapon, especially valuable for states with small navies. Italy declared she had an open mind on the subject and her general position was that she would not disagree with the decision, for abolition or otherwise, arrived at by the other powers. She intimated, however, that abolition would be much more favourably considered if abolition of capital ships were also involved.

35. Under the circumstances, agreement on abolition was impossible. The First Committee and its experts, however, under instructions from the Heads of Delegations, succeeded in drawing up agreements concerning the "humanisation of submarine warfare" and the "unit size" of submarines. Both of these agreements were accepted by the full Conference and appear in the Treaty. The first supplanting the so-called Root Agreement of 1921, which had never come into force as France had not ratified it, becomes Part IV of the Treaty of 1930, and reads as follows:—

ARTICLE 22

"The following are accepted as established rules of International Law

(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

"The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules."

36. It should be noted that Part IV, in contrast to the other Parts of the Treaty, remains in force without limit of time. Also, that these regulations are included in the main Treaty, and not, as at Washington, in a separate convention.

37. There is also the agreement on the unit size of submarines which appears as Article VII of the Treaty, Part II. By this Article the maximum standard displacement of a submarine is placed at 2,000 tons, and the maximum gun calibre 5.1-inch. As a result of the earnest representation of France each of the High Contracting Parties, however, may possess 3 submarines not exceeding 2,800 tons each with guns not above 6.1-inch. Within this number France was allowed to retain one unit, already launched, which was 80 tons over the maximum.

(5) *Destroyers.*

38. Concerning the characteristics of the Destroyer category there was but little discussion. The French and Italian Delegations were not concerned, having been conceded a combined cruiser-destroyer category. At the Nineteenth Meeting of the Committee of Experts the other Delegations agreed to a unit tonnage limitation of 1,850 tons for destroyer leaders and 1,500 tons for destroyers and that not more than 16 per cent of the total destroyer tonnage of any Power should be allowed to destroyer leaders. As regards the gun calibre it was agreed not to exceed 5". This agreement was accepted by the First Committee and appears as Article XV in Part III of the Treaty.

(6) *6-inch Cruisers.*

39. The subject of the characteristics of 6" gun cruisers was taken up by Heads of Delegations, the First Committee and in meetings of experts. The discussions on characteristics hinged mainly on whether there should be a maximum limit to the unit tonnage of these ships below 10,000 tons (the Washington Treaty limit for cruisers), and also whether there should be a minimum unit tonnage limit somewhat higher than the maximum of the destroyer category with a "non-construction zone" between them so as to clearly differentiate between the two categories. The latter proposal emanated from the Japanese Delegation and, after some discussion, was withdrawn.

40. On the other point, the United Kingdom delegation desired from the beginning a lower tonnage limit for the individual 6-inch gun cruiser than for the 8-inch gun ship which, as stated above, was 10,000 tons. They proposed a limit of between 6,000 and 7,000 tons and were supported by Japan. This, however was opposed by the French and, strongly, by the United States, who could not accept any division of the cruiser classes on a displacement basis. Eventually no upper limit below that laid down for cruisers under the Washington Treaty (10,000 tons) was imposed.

(7) *8-inch Cruisers and Capital Ships.*

41. There were no changes made in the characteristics of these classes and the negotiations over their limitation and reduction will be considered in the part of this Report dealing with political matters.

(8) *Air-Craft Carriers.*

42. Aircraft carriers were defined in the Washington Treaty as vessels of war over 10,000 tons displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft; so constructed that aircraft could be launched therefrom and landed thereon, and not carrying a gun in excess of 8-inch calibre. There arose the question of the definition, allocation as regards category, etc., of vessels intended to carry out the functions of the aircraft carrier but not over 10,000 tons displacement. Considerable discussion took place over this question on the part of Heads of Delegations, the First Committee and the Experts, there being a division of opinion as to whether aircraft carriers not over 10,000 tons should be included in the aircraft carrier category as defined at Washington or in the cruiser class. It was felt by some delegations that if such ships mounted guns exceeding 6-inch in calibre they should be classed as cruisers.

43. The solution eventually found to this difficulty, which appears as Articles 3, 4 and 5 of the Treaty, widens the definition of the Washington Treaty as follows:—

“The expression ‘aircraft carrier’ includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.”

No aircraft carrier under 10,000 tons shall mount a gun in excess of 6·1 inches.

44. The Canadian delegation strongly supported this limitation of the development of the newest, and possibly the most terrorizing, of modern weapons. Unfortunately, it was not possible to obtain at this Conference a reduction of the total tonnage and maximum displacement limits laid down in the Washington Treaty for aircraft carriers. It was agreed to postpone this matter till the Conference of 1935.

(9) *Rules for the Disposal of Vessels of War and for Replacement.*

45. These subjects were given exhaustive consideration by the Committee of Experts and technical sub-Committees to which they had been referred by the First Committee. The Reports of this Expert Committee were accepted by the First Committee and later by the Heads of Delegations. They form the basis for Article II and Annex II of Part II of the Treaty (Rules for Disposal) and Article 9 and Annex I of Part II (Rules for Replacement). In the rules for replacement no change was made as regards the age limits of capital ships and aircraft carriers from those established by the Washington Treaty, excepting that provided by the agreement to abstain from replacing ships in these classes till 1936. As to cruisers, destroyers and submarines, age limits for these were established as follows:—

Cruisers

- (1) if laid down before January 1, 1920: 16 years;
- (2) if laid down after that date: 20 years.

Destroyers

- (1) if laid down before January 1, 1921: 12 years;
- (2) if laid down after that date: 16 years.

Submarines

13 years.

PART II

46. It was clear from the beginning that behind and dominating the discussions over categories, guns, and tons, there always lay the political factor. As Signor Grandi put it quite frankly at the third plenary session:

"It has been stated and acknowledged in all the countries here represented, if I am not mistaken, that our problem is essentially a political one. This assertion is self-evident. The limitation of armaments means the acceptance by Governments of restrictions to a fundamental right inherent in national sovereignty. The voluntary renunciation of freedom of action in the matter of armaments is essentially a political act. We should not fear to state that we are here not so much to solve a technical, but first and foremost, a political question."

POLITICAL NEGOTIATIONS ON TONNAGE RATIOS AND PROGRAMS

47. At the second plenary session, held on January 23rd, each delegation was invited to contribute to the solving of these political difficulties by furnishing the Conference with a statement of its naval needs. Certain delegations, the United Kingdom, French, Japanese, Italian, Australian and New Zealand, availed themselves of this opportunity. Mr. MacDonald, for the United Kingdom, explained that a detailed estimate of the needs of his country had already been made public, and, therefore, his remarks would be for the most part of a general nature. He epitomized the problem for Great Britain in the following sentences:

"Therefore, the problem which has to be faced by a British Government is not a problem essentially or primarily of maintaining dominion; it is a problem of maintaining life. It is not to satisfy an acquisitive sense, it is to satisfy the will to live, that lies at the foundation of our naval problem. The world must be open to us for food and for life."

Signor Grandi, in discussing Italy's needs, reiterated his previous declaration that Italy was willing to reduce her armaments to any level no matter how low, provided that level was not exceeded by any other European continental power. M. Tardieu's statement was longer and more specific than the others, and was a detailed exposition of his country's naval needs. The remaining declarations were brief and general in character.

48. Following this plenary session there were numerous conversations between the various Powers relating to their naval policies and claims. These talks prepared the way for the next stage of the Conference's activities when the Powers presented these claims and policies to the world by means of statements.* The United States declaration was published on February 7th, the British on the same day, the French on the 13th, the Japanese on the 17th and the Italian on the 19th. These statements showed clearly enough the difficulties that lay ahead in the way of reaching any Five Power Agreement on naval strengths. The Conference had now reached, with the publication of figures, hard reality and began to come to grips with the problems confronting it. The figures showed what these problems were likely to be.

* Annex H

49. Mr. Stimson's statement may be divided into two parts: the first dealing with the United States and Great Britain, the second with the United States and the other Powers. As to the first, his demand was immediate parity in every class of ship in the navy. As to what constituted parity, Mr. Stimson made the following important declaration:

"Under our suggestion the actual tonnage difference between the two cruiser fleets will be only 12,000 tons. Of the larger cruisers armed with eight-inch guns Great Britain will have 15 and the United States 18, an advantage to the latter of 30,000 tons. Of the smaller cruisers armed with six-inch guns Great Britain will have an advantage of 42,000 tons. But beyond this, in order to insure exact equality of opportunity the United States makes the suggestion that each country will have the option of duplicating exactly the cruiser fleet of the other. Thus Great Britain would have the option, by reducing its number of small cruisers, to increase its large cruisers from 15 to 18 so as to give it a total tonnage of 327,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the United States now asks. On the other hand, the United States would have the option, by reducing its large cruisers from 18 to 15, to increase the number of its small cruisers so as to give it a total cruiser tonnage of 339,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the British now ask.

"In battle ships we suggest by reduction in numbers on both sides to equalize our two fleets in 1931 instead of in 1942. At present the British battleship fleet contains two more vessels than ours. In destroyers and aircraft carriers we suggest equality in tonnage and in submarines the lowest tonnage possible. As is well known we will gladly agree to a total abolition of submarines if it is possible to obtain the consent of all five powers to such a proposition, and in any event we suggest that the operations of submarines be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft in operation against merchant ships so that they cannot attack without providing for the safety of the passengers and crew."

50. The most significant feature of this statement is its indication of the removal of most of the remaining differences between the United States and British positions, and especially in minimizing the difficulties regarding 8" cruisers by the reduction of the United States 8" cruiser demands from 21 to 18.

51. The second part of the United States memorandum suggested to the Japanese "an over-all relation satisfactory to us, and, we hope, to them in conformity with our relations in the past. It is not based upon the same ratio in every class of ships." No proposals were made to the French or Italians.

52. The United Kingdom statement began with an analysis of the political basis on which the work of disarmament must proceed; emphasized the necessity of limitation by categories as well as by total fleet tonnage, though admitting limited transfer between certain categories; made certain proposals for reduction and limitation in battleships, aircraft carriers and destroyers; and proposed the abolition of the submarine. As to cruisers it was held that they should be divided into 8" and 6" gun classes, with the maximum size of the smaller class between 6,000 and 7,000 tons. It was also stated that the requirements of the British Commonwealth would consist of 50 cruisers with a total tonnage of 339,000.

53. The French statement which appeared next pointed out that France had noticeably reduced her naval forces since 1914. Her total figures, built, building and authorized in that year were 1,139,000. At present, they were only 681,808. France contemplated, the statement declared, reaching a total tonnage

figure of 724,479 by 1936, which would necessitate, in replacement and new construction, the building of 240,000 tons during the next six years. The French statement closed with the following interesting paragraph:

"France has never become alarmed on seeing the United States and Great Britain either reduce or increase their respective naval forces in order to reach their agreement. In the same spirit of mutual confidence she believes that the figures which she has put forward above, as being a simple statement of her national needs, and which she made known at the first meeting of the Conference, will not in any way alarm the two other nations. Further, as she has always declared, she is ready to examine, favourably, any formula of mutual guarantees for security which would allow the definite requirements of each one to become relative requirements."

54. Signor Grandi's statement repeated the Italian desire to reduce its navy as far as possible provided it was not exceeded by that of any other European continental power. No tonnage figures, however, were given covering Italy's own requirements in the immediate future.

55. The final statement, that of Japan, was brief, moderate and general in character. So far as tonnage requirements in auxiliary craft vis-a-vis other powers was concerned, the Japanese memorandum, without mentioning figures, contented itself with observing that Japan considered it necessary to hold a strength "in adequate proportion to that of the other powers concerned."

56. From the above statements and from the conversations that preceded and followed them, it could be seen that there had now emerged from the Conference four distinct problems which had to be settled and the settlements related to each other before any Five Power agreement could be achieved.

The Anglo-American

The Japan-American

The Franco-Italian

The Anglo-Continental.

57. The attempt to solve some, at least, of these problems was, unfortunately, interrupted by the defeat of the French Government on February 17th, from which date till the 7th of March there was no authorized government delegate from France. It is not accurate to say that during this interval France ceased to participate in the work of the Conference. She continued to be represented and to take part in the technical discussions, and the French Ambassador was most punctilious and cordial in his readiness to co-operate in so far as was possible under the peculiar circumstances. However, in discussions of policy during these weeks France could take no part, and hence no decisions could be made. So far then as the "continental group" (Anglo-French-Italian) was concerned, the Conference, during this period, was almost at a standstill. But there were the other problems which concerned what was called the "high seas group." (Commonwealth-United States-Japan). A great deal of useful work was done to reach agreement on these.

Anglo-American Problem.

58. So far as the Anglo-American naval question was concerned, the United States memoranda referred to above showed how close the two positions were. The differences which remained were exhaustively discussed in conversations between the two powers and agreement, involving certain concessions on both sides, was eventually reached on every question. The terms of that agreement will be found in the text of the Treaty* itself and are discussed later in this Report.

Japan-American Problem.

59. At the same time discussions and conversations were carried on between the United States and Japanese delegations to reconcile the differences between their two positions, the most important of these being the Japanese claim for 70 per cent of the 8-inch gun cruiser tonnage of the strongest naval power. That would mean if the United States possessed 18 8-inch gun cruisers, Japan might claim 13, or only 2 less than the number allotted to the British Commonwealth under the United States proposals. Here again, a spirit of conciliation was exhibited on both sides, with the result that a compromise was arrived at which was satisfactory to both delegations.

Three Power Agreement.

60. As a result of the solution of these two problems, an agreement on tonnage ratios and total strengths, between the British Commonwealth, the United States and Japan became possible. It was first drawn up in tentative form and after it had received the approval of the respective governments was ready to be incorporated in any treaty that might result. One great phase of the work of the Conference had been brought to a successful and satisfactory conclusion.

61. An agreement between the members of the Continental Group proved more difficult. It is true that on March 7, with M. Tardieu once again established in Paris, a new French delegation returned to London under the leadership of M. Briand and with M. Dumesnil the newly appointed Minister for the Navy, as a member. It is true that negotiations between Italy, France and Great Britain once again commenced. But no complete agreement could be reached.

Franco-Italian Problem.

62. In the first place, the Franco-Italian problem remained unsolved. The Italian claim for parity with the strongest European continental Power, that is, in effect, with France, could not be accepted by that latter Power; nor could it be abandoned by Italy which maintained it from the outset. The French felt that parity with Italy meant for France, with its large colonial Empire, inferiority in the Mediterranean, a sea of such vital importance to her. Italy pointed out that inferiority for her in the Mediterranean meant that, situated as she was in an enclosed sea whose outlets were in the hands of foreign Powers, her very existence was at stake. Many avenues for the solution of this difficulty were explored by the representatives of the two Powers assisted by the British, but, at the adjournment of the Conference, success had not yet been achieved.

Anglo-Continental Problem—Anglo-French Conversations.

63. Equally difficult of solution was the Anglo-Continental problem. This had two aspects: one an attempt by the British to reconcile the French and Italian positions; the other, an effort to persuade France to reduce its tonnage figures as previously set forth. France, however, felt that she could not make this reduction without receiving in return some form of guarantee which would increase her security, especially in the Mediterranean. The question was: What form should this guarantee take?

64. It was recognized that disarmament was a much more effective agency for peace if it were brought about by the substitution of guarantees for arms. But certain Delegations felt that these guarantees should take the form of machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes rather than of military or naval sanctions.

65. For some time, then, after the return of the French delegation, negotiations between the two countries largely took the form of a "search for a formula," one that would give France the desired guarantee and yet not increase Great Britain's commitments. There was no acceptance of what was often referred to as a "Mediterranean Locarno." In a speech broadcast to America at this time the British Prime Minister put the case against such a commitment clearly and forcefully.

"We shall not agree to base any treaty which may result from this Conference on entangling military alliances. The bonds of war are not, and cannot be, the security of peace. That would undo in spirit and in policy the work of the Conference; but some of us will strive to secure as an essential part of the agreement a pledge of good will and pacific intention similar to that made by the President and myself after we had convinced ourselves that a Naval Agreement was possible. Such a pledge ought to allow programs to be reduced to a minimum if we have any confidence in each other's signatures."

66a. There were, then, discussions over a consultative pact similar to that signed between the four Powers at Washington in 1921. Even the United States delegation was not unalterably opposed to such a pact. During these discussions, Mr. Stimson issued a statement to the effect that a consultative pact could never be accepted as a quid pro quo for France reducing her tonnage, and the United States felt they could not be put in a position of having impliedly promised material help in return for reduction. "If, however," the statement added, "this demand for security could be satisfied in some other way, then the danger of misunderstanding a consultative pact would be eliminated and in such case the question would be approached from an entirely different standpoint. In such a case the American delegation would consider the matter with an entirely open mind." The discussions over such a pact, however, had no result.

b. Other suggestions for satisfying the desires of the French were then considered; an interpretation of the obligations of Article XVI of the Covenant, or a declaration by the two powers reiterating their willingness to carry out any obligations already entered into. Conversations along these lines were carried on for a time by experts from the Foreign Office and the Quai d'Orsay.

67a. No concrete proposals, however, resulted from these "guarantee conversations." It was discovered that they were creating some uneasiness and an atmosphere unfavourable to their continuance. They were, therefore, dropped.

b. With, then, Italy insisting on the principle of parity with France and France unable to admit this principle or reduce its tonnage figure, it became evident that any immediate Five Power agreement on tonnage limitation could not be secured. A great deal of useful work, however, had been accomplished and its results accepted by all the powers at the Conference. Furthermore, the "High Seas Group" had also reached agreement on tonnage figures. That agreement might now be analysed.

THREE POWER AGREEMENT ON AUXILIARY SHIP PROGRAMS

68. The above agreement was embodied in Part III of the Treaty, and by it the tonnage figures in auxiliary vessels are laid down as follows:

Categories	United States	British Commonwealth of Nations	Japan
Cruisers:			
(a) with guns of more than 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre.	180,000 tons (182,880 metric tons)	146,600 tons (149,149 metric tons)	108,400 tons (110,134 metric tons)
(b) with guns of 6.1- inch (155 mm.) cali- bre or less.	143,500 tons (145,796 metric tons)	192,200 tons (195,275 metric tons)	100,450 tons (102,057 metric tons)
Destroyers	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	105,500 tons (107,188 metric tons)
Submarines	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)

69. Furthermore, Article 16 (3) reads:

"The maximum number of cruisers of sub-category (a) shall be as follows: for the United States, eighteen; for the British Commonwealth of Nations, fifteen; for Japan, twelve."

70. It will be noticed that the British Commonwealth is given a slightly larger total cruiser tonnage than the United States as a compensation for having three less 8-inch gun cruisers. It might be argued that this excess is not sufficient compensation for the difference in heavy cruisers. The agreement, however, provides, in addition, that the British Commonwealth may choose, if she desires, to build eighteen 8-inch cruisers reducing her 6-inch tonnage to that of the United States, just as the latter may come down to fifteen 8-inch cruisers and up to the British figures in 6-inch tonnage. Furthermore, Article 18 of the Treaty states:

"The United States contemplates the completion by 1935 of fifteen cruisers of sub-category (a) of an aggregate tonnage of 150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons). For each of the three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a) which it is entitled to construct the United States may elect to substitute 15,166 tons (15,409 metric tons) of cruisers of sub-category (b). In case the United States shall construct one or more of such three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a), the sixteenth unit will not be laid down before 1933 and will not be completed before 1936; the seventeenth will not be laid down before 1934 and will not be completed before 1937; the eighteenth will not be laid down before 1935 and will not be completed before 1938."

On the other hand, the reduction of the United States claim regarding 8-inch cruisers from twenty-one to eighteen is met by the British concession of a United States aggregate of 6-inch tonnage in excess of that which she, Great Britain, was originally prepared to admit as denoting parity in total cruiser strengths. Concessions, then, were made on both sides and both recognized the resulting agree-

ment as fair. In this connection Mr. Stimson said on signing the Treaty: "We shall sign this Treaty now before us, with a realization that it fixes our naval relationship with the British Commonwealth of Nations upon a fair and lasting basis, and that it is equally advantageous to us all." As for Japan, she obtained 66 per cent, not 70 per cent, of United States 8-inch tonnage. She found it easier to make this concession because

- (1) the duration of the treaty was limited;
- (2) she reserved the right to renew her original demand in 1935;
- (3) she was granted parity in submarines and a 70 per cent ratio in light cruisers and destroyers.

71. The following table will give an indication of the amount of reduction in auxiliary naval tonnage brought about as a result of this agreement:

	Built, Building and Authorized	Treaty	Change
Cruisers—			
British Commonwealth of Nations.. . . .	377,911	339,000	—38,911
U.S.A...	300,500	323,500	+23,000
Japan...	203,015	209,850	+ 6,835
Destroyers—			
British Commonwealth of Nations.. . . .	197,061	150,000	—47,061
U.S.A...	308,304	150,000	—158,304
Japan...	123,425	105,500	—17,925
Submarines—			
British Commonwealth of Nations.. . . .	66,364	52,700	—13,664
U.S.A...	84,670	52,700	—31,970
Japan...	77,842	52,700	—25,142

FIVE POWER AGREEMENT ON CAPITAL SHIP PROGRAMS

72. Though it was not found possible to secure a Five Power Agreement on auxiliary ship programs and tonnage figures, such an agreement was achieved as regards capital ships, replacing and supplementing the provisions of the Washington Treaty.

73. Article I of the Treaty thus provides for a "battleship holiday" till 1936. By this clause, the signatory powers agree to renounce their rights of capital ship replacement for the years 1931-1936 under the earlier Treaty; rights under which they were entitled to lay down 32 battleships aggregating 1,470,000 tons. In addition the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan agreed to scrap 9 battleships within eighteen months of the coming into force of the Treaty; battleships which under the Treaty of 1921 they would have retained till 1936. Of these the United Kingdom was to dispose of 5, the United States 3 and Japan 1, bringing battleship ratios for these powers down to 15-15-9. A tonnage comparison in capital ships as a result of this provision of the Treaty is shown in the following table:

	Washington Quota	Existing	Treaty	Change from Washington Treaty
British Commonwealth of Nations.. . . .	525,000	558,950	474,750	—50,250
U.S.A.	525,000	525,850	462,500	—62,500
Japan	315,000	301,320	266,070	—48,930
France	175,000	192,557*	164,000	—11,000
Italy	175,000	90,054	164,000	—11,000

* (includes 3 ships over age).

THE WINDING UP OF THE CONFERENCE

74. The question that now confronted the delegates was the form in which the agreements arrived at should be embodied. It was this that occupied the closing days of the Conference.

75. On March 24, in a Conference between the British Prime Minister and Signor Grandi it had been proposed that owing to Franco-Italian difficulties the Conference should be formally adjourned for six months, during which time France and Italy should continue their conversations. Meanwhile, the United States, Japan and the British Commonwealth of Nations should negotiate a Three Power Treaty as soon as possible and when the French and Italians were able to settle their differences the question of enlarging this Three Power Treaty into a Five Power Treaty could be taken up. At the time of this suggestion however, the Conference was still waiting to hear the decision of the Japanese Government on the proposals that had been submitted to it some time previously, therefore it could not be accepted.

76. From the beginning the chairman had worked for a Five Power and not a Three Power Treaty. It is true that for a time it appeared that it might be necessary to draw up two instruments, a Three Power Treaty on Ratios and Programs restricted to the High Seas Group, and a Five Power Treaty on those subjects on which agreements had been found possible. It was recognized, however, that it would be much preferable to have one Treaty covering all questions and this was eventually brought about by including the Three Power Agreement as a separate part of a Five Power Treaty and by making that part applicable only to Japan, the United States and the British Commonwealth.

SAFEGUARDING CLAUSE

77. There was, however, one important obstacle in the way of a Three Power agreement, whether by itself or as part of a Five Power Treaty. The United Kingdom is both a "High Seas" and a "Continental" power. It was, therefore, manifestly impossible for her to accept any figures vis-a-vis Japan and the United States while the continental powers remained outside any agreement, unless some clause was inserted in the agreement releasing any signatory power from its obligations in case the building programs of a non-signatory state or states were considered such as to threaten its security. This result was achieved by Article 21 of the Treaty, the "Safeguarding Clause," which read as follows:

"If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefor, and shall be entitled to make such increase. There upon the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented."

78. Referring to this "Safeguarding Clause" during the last session of the Conference, Mr. MacDonald spoke as follows*:

"It is not put in as an easy way to get round the Treaty. I hope it will never be used, but if it has to be, that will only happen after every effort has been made to avoid it. Only when it is apparent that owing to the ships built, building or definitely authorized by any Power or Powers, our naval position is so affected that it is impossible for this country to rest in peace of mind upon the figures embodied in Part III of this Treaty; only then shall this protection clause be brought into operation."

* Annex K

THE SIGNING OF THE TREATY

79. The Treaty was signed at St. James's Palace at the Final Plenary Session, held on the morning of April 22, 1930. The proceedings included speeches from all the heads of delegations, certain of which are attached to this report. After the actual ceremony of signing, M Briand expressed the feelings of everyone present in paying a gracious tribute to the tact, perseverance, resourcefulness and courtesy of the chairman.

80. The Treaty was signed for Canada by the Honourable Philippe Roy, Canadian Minister in Paris.

THE ADJOURNMENT OF THE CONFERENCE

81. The Conference did not dissolve; it adjourned. It came to an end only in the sense that it had accomplished all that was possible at the time to secure the objectives before it. Certain of these objectives were not realized, therefore it was considered wise to halt temporarily in order to give further time for negotiations between the United Kingdom, France and Italy, whose differences had not yet been settled.

82. M. Briand at the Final Plenary Session in emphasizing this idea that the Conference had not come to an end, but merely postponed its deliberations in order to give his country and Italy a further opportunity of canvassing these difficulties, spoke as follows:

"The Conference remains open, and diplomatic efforts will continue in order to settle this last difficulty. The French Government can never believe that two great and friendly Nations, moved with a sincere desire of conciliating their respective preoccupations and loyally determined to make every effort in order to reach this goal, should not be able to achieve a complete agreement, thanks to an objective effort, with the help of a little reciprocal comprehension, and the mutual confidence which they owe to each other. The complementary agreement reached by three of us is too precious a contribution to the general maintenance of peace, for France and Italy not to have a very keen desire to extend it."

83. The work of the Conference, then, goes on, and the Treaty itself makes provision for its re-assembling for Article 23 reads:

Unless the High Contracting Parties should agree otherwise by reason of a more general agreement limiting naval armaments, to which they all become parties, they shall meet in conference in 1935 to frame a new treaty to replace and to carry out the purposes of the present Treaty, it being understood that none of the provisions of the present Treaty shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the Conference agreed to."

THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE

84. The brief analysis of certain sections of the Treaty given in the body of this Report provides some indication of the work accomplished. It is, of course, true that this accomplishment fell short of the desires of many. It is true that all hopes were not realized; all objectives were not won. But if the Conference fell short of its highest hopes it has gone far compared with Washington and Geneva. The work of Washington has been supplemented and brought nearer to completion; the obstacles which prevented any agreement among the three powers at Geneva have now been surmounted. Furthermore, the agreement that has been reached between those powers is on a considerably lower basis than that provided by the proposals put forward in 1927. To consider the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States alone. In 1927 the former asked

for the maintenance of the battleship tonnage established by the Washington Treaty: 606,000 tons for itself and 525,000 for the United States. The agreement of 1930 is on a tonnage basis of 460,000 for each, with no replacements for the next six years. A British White Paper* on the results of the Conference, published on April 15, estimates that this alone means a saving for the United Kingdom during the next six years of £54,000,000. In addition the final British proposals at the Geneva Conference for cruisers, destroyers and submarines, including over-age vessels, amounted to a total tonnage of over 737,500. The total in the 1930 Treaty is 541,700. This, it is estimated, means a further saving of £13,000,000. These figures show that for the British Commonwealth of Nations, at least, the Treaty means reduction, with a saving of millions, and parity with United States on a lower level than that of 1927. In a sentence, the result is: the Commonwealth scraps more; the United States builds less.

85. There are also important concrete results from the Five Power Agreement. Nine battleships are to be scrapped; the replacement of thirty-two others is to be postponed. The unit size of submarines is limited; their use against merchant ships is restricted. The development of the aircraft carrier has been curtailed; and rules for disposal and replacement have been adopted. Agreement has also been reached on the subject of "special" and "exempt" vessels.

86. There is, however, a more important result than all this. The Treaty means the elimination of competitive building between the world's greatest naval powers, with the beneficial result in their political relations that must follow. The Dominion of Canada may especially congratulate itself that this naval agreement has established the naval relations, and thereby helped to establish the political relations, of its neighbour to the south and its neighbour to the west, with the British Commonwealth of Nations on a firm, friendly and, we hope, permanent foundation.

87. Furthermore, the Conference is to be judged on more than its immediate and concrete results. It would be wholly misleading to consider the Treaty signed at St. James' on April 22 as an end in itself. It represents, as Washington and Geneva represented, and as the League disarmament meetings represent, a stage in a continuous process. As Mr. MacDonald said in his final remarks:—

"This is but another stage and the work will have to be continued. We must go on attacking the problems which have baffled us... True the work has been but partially done, but all great advances of this kind must be in stages and we have gone much further than has as yet been possible... We must go on strengthening the new mentality of peace and applying it, step by step, in further reductions."

88. This, then, is the real value of the Conference. It has advanced one step further the progress, slow and labourious as it must be, towards disarmament. It has driven a little deeper into the consciousness of the nations the necessity for conference and compromise if the above goal is to be reached. It has removed such highly explosive things as navies and naval ambitions further from the field of exclusive national sovereignty and more into the realm of international control. Finally, eleven States, five of them the most powerful of naval and military powers, five of them young and developing democracies, one an ancient Empire, stand pledged before the world to continue their efforts "to facilitate the progressive realization of the limitation and reduction of armaments."

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient servant,

J. L. RALSTON.

The Right Honourable W. L. MACKENZIE KING, C.M.G., M.P.,

Prime Minister and Secretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa.

* Annex L

ANNEX A

LONDON NAVAL TREATY, 1930

THE President of the United States of America, the President of the French Republic, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, His Majesty the King of Italy, and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan,

Desiring to prevent the dangers and reduce the burdens inherent in competitive armaments, and

Desiring to carry forward the work begun by the Washington Naval Conference and to facilitate the progressive realization of general limitation and reduction of armaments,

Have resolved to conclude a Treaty for the limitation and reduction of naval armament, and have accordingly appointed as their Plenipotentiaries:—

The President of the United States of America:

Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of State;
Charles G. Dawes, Ambassador to the Court of St. James;
Charles Francis Adams, Secretary of the Navy;
Joseph T. Robinson, Senator from the State of Arkansas;
David A. Reed, Senator from the State of Pennsylvania;
Hugh Gibson, Ambassador to Belgium;
Dwight W. Morrow, Ambassador to Mexico;

The President of the French Republic:

Mr. André Tardieu, Deputy, President of the Council of Ministers, Minister of the Interior;
Mr. Aristide Briand, Deputy, Minister for Foreign Affairs;
Mr. Jacques-Louis Dumesnil, Deputy, Minister of Marine;
Mr. François Piétri, Deputy, Minister of the Colonies;
Mr. Aimé-Joseph de Fleuriau, Ambassador of the French Republic at the Court of St. James;

His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India:

For Great Britain and Northern Ireland and all parts of the British Empire which are not separate Members of the League of Nations:

The Right Honourable James Ramsay MacDonald, M.P., First Lord of His Treasury and Prime Minister;

The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M.P., His Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

The Right Honourable Albert Victor Alexander, M.P., First Lord of His Admiralty;

The Right Honourable William Wedgwood Benn, D.S.O., D.F.C., M.P., His Principal Secretary of State for India;

For the Dominion of Canada:

Colonel The Honourable James Layton Ralston, C.M.G., D.S.O., K.C., a Member of His Privy Council for Canada, His Minister for National Defence;

The Honourable Philippe Roy, a Member of His Privy Council for Canada, His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary in France for the Dominion of Canada;

For the Commonwealth of Australia:

The Honourable James Edward Fenton, His Minister for Trade and Customs;

For the Dominion of New Zealand:—

Thomas Mason Wilford, Esquire, K.C., High Commissioner for the Dominion of New Zealand in London;

For the Union of South Africa:—

Charles Theodore te Water, Esquire, High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London;

For the Irish Free State:—

Timothy Aloysius Smiddy, Esquire, High Commissioner for the Irish Free State in London;

For India:—

Sir Atul Chandra Chatterjee, K.C.I.E., High Commissioner for India in London;

His Majesty the King of Italy:—

The Honourable Dino Grandi, Deputy, His Minister Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs;

Admiral of Division The Honourable Giuseppe Sirianni, Senator of the Kingdom, His Minister Secretary of State for Marine;

Mr. Antonio Chiaramonte-Bordonaro, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. James;

Admiral The Honourable Baron Alfredo Acton, Senator of the Kingdom;

His Majesty the Emperor of Japan:—

Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki, Member of the House of Peers;

Admiral Takeshi Takarabe, Minister for the Navy;

Mr. Tsuneo Matsudaira, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at the Court of St. James;

Mr. Matsuzo Nagai, His Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty the King of the Belgians;

Who, having communicated to one another their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed as follows:

PART I

ARTICLE 1

The High Contracting Parties agree not to exercise their rights to lay down the keels of capital ship replacement tonnage during the years 1931-1936 inclusive as provided in Chapter II, Part 3 of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament signed between them at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, and referred to in the present Treaty as the Washington Treaty.

This provision is without prejudice to the disposition relating to the replacement of ships accidentally lost or destroyed contained in Chapter II, Part 3, Section I, paragraph (c) of the said Treaty.

France and Italy may, however, build the replacement tonnage which they were entitled to lay down in 1927 and 1929 in accordance with the provisions of the said Treaty.

ARTICLE 2

1. The United States, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Japan shall dispose of the following capital ships as provided in this Article:—

United States:

“Florida.”

“Utah.”

“Arkansas” or “Wyoming.”

United Kingdom:

“Benbow”.

“Iron Duke”.

“Marlborough”.

“Emperor of India”.

“Tiger”.

Japan:

“Hiyei”.

(a) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (b), the above ships, unless converted to target use exclusively in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, paragraph II (c) of the Washington Treaty, shall be scrapped in the following manner:

One of the ships to be scrapped by the United States, and two of those to be scrapped by the United Kingdom shall be rendered unfit for warlike service, in accordance with Chapter II, Part 2, paragraph III (b) of the Washington Treaty, within twelve months from the coming into force of the present Treaty. These ships shall be finally scrapped, in accordance with paragraph II (a) or (b) of the said Part 2, within twenty-four months from the said coming into force. In the case of the second of the ships to be scrapped by the United States, and of the third and fourth of the ships to be scrapped by the United Kingdom, the said periods shall be eighteen and thirty months respectively from the coming into force of the present Treaty.

(b) Of the ships to be disposed of under this Article, the following may be retained for training purposes:

by the United States: “Arkansas” or “Wyoming”.

by the United Kingdom: “Iron Duke.”

by Japan: “Hiyei”.

These ships shall be reduced to the condition prescribed in Section V of Annex II to Part II of the present Treaty. The work of reducing these vessels to the required condition shall begin, in the case of the United States and the United Kingdom, within twelve months, and in the case of Japan within eighteen months from the coming into force of the present Treaty; the work shall be completed within six months of the expiration of the above-mentioned periods.

Any of these ships which are not retained for training purposes shall be rendered unfit for warlike service within eighteen months, and finally scrapped within thirty months, of the coming into force of the present Treaty.

2. Subject to any disposal of capital ships which might be necessitated, in accordance with the Washington Treaty, by the building by France or Italy of the replacement tonnage referred to in Article 1 of the present Treaty, all exist-

ing capital ships mentioned in Chapter II, Part 3, Section II of the Washington Treaty and not designated above to be disposed of may be retained during the term of the present Treaty.

3. The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage, and the old vessel may be retained until replaced even though due for scrapping under Chapter II, Part 3, Section II of the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 3

1. For the purposes of the Washington Treaty, the definition of an aircraft carrier given in Chapter II, Part 4 of the said Treaty is hereby replaced by the following definition:

The expression "aircraft carrier" includes any surface vessel of war, whatever its displacement, designed for the specific and exclusive purpose of carrying aircraft and so constructed that aircraft can be launched therefrom and landed thereon.

2. The fitting of a landing-on or flying-off platform or deck on a capital ship, cruiser or destroyer, provided such vessel was not designed or adapted exclusively as an aircraft carrier, shall not cause any vessel so fitted to be charged against or classified in the category of aircraft carriers.

3. No capital ship in existence on the 1st April, 1930, shall be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck.

ARTICLE 4

1. No aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement mounting a gun above 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre shall be acquired by or constructed by or for any of the High Contracting Parties.

2. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty in respect of all the High Contracting Parties, no aircraft carrier of 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) or less standard displacement mounting a gun above 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 5

An aircraft carrier must not be designed and constructed for carrying a more powerful armament than that authorized by Article IX or Article X of the Washington Treaty, or by Article 4 of the present Treaty, as the case may be.

Wherever in the said Articles IX and X the calibre of 6 inches (152 mm.) is mentioned, the calibre of 6·1 inches (155 mm.) is substituted therefor.

PART II

ARTICLE 6

1. The rules for determining standard displacement prescribed in Chapter II, Part 4 of the Washington Treaty, shall apply to all surface vessels of war of each of the High Contracting Parties.

2. The standard displacement of a submarine is the surface displacement of the vessel complete (exclusive of the water in non-watertight structure) fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions for crew, miscellaneous stores, and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel, lubricating oil, fresh water or ballast water of any kind on board.

3. Each naval combatant vessel shall be rated at its displacement tonnage when in the standard condition. The word "ton", except in the expression "metric tons", shall be understood to be the ton of 2,240 pounds (1,016 kilos.).

ARTICLE 7

1. No submarine the standard displacement of which exceeds 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1-inch (130 mm.) calibre shall be acquired by or constructed by or for any of the High Contracting Parties.

2. Each of the High Contracting Parties may, however, retain, build or acquire a maximum number of three submarines of a standard displacement not exceeding 2,800 tons (2,845 metric tons); these submarines may carry guns not above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre. Within this number, France may retain one unit, already launched, of 2,880 tons (2,926 metric tons), with guns the calibre of which is 8 inches (203 mm.).

3. The High Contracting Parties may retain the submarines which they possessed on the 1st April, 1930, having a standard displacement not in excess of 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) and armed with guns above 5.1 inch (130 mm.) calibre.

4. As from the coming into force of the present Treaty in respect of all the High Contracting Parties, no submarine the standard displacement of which exceeds 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) or with a gun above 5.1-inch (130 mm.) calibre shall be constructed within the jurisdiction of any of the High Contracting Parties, except as provided in paragraph 2 of this Article.

ARTICLE 8

Subject to any special agreements which may submit them to limitation, the following vessels are exempt from limitation:

(a) naval surface combatant vessels of 600 tons (610 metric tons) standard displacement and under;

(b) naval surface combatant vessels exceeding 600 tons (610 metric tons), but not exceeding 2,000 tons (2,032 metric tons) standard displacement, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (2) mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
- (3) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
- (4) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots.

(c) naval surface vessels not specifically built as fighting ships which are employed on fleet duties or as troop transports or in some other way than as fighting ships, provided they have none of the following characteristics:

- (1) mount a gun above 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (2) mount more than four guns above 3-inch (76 mm.) calibre;
- (3) are designed or fitted to launch torpedoes;
- (4) are designed for a speed greater than twenty knots;
- (5) are protected by armour plate;
- (6) are designed or fitted to launch mines;
- (7) are fitted to receive aircraft on board from the air;
- (8) mount more than one aircraft-launching apparatus on the centre line;

or two, one on each broadside;

(9) if fitted with any means of launching aircraft into the air, are designed or adapted to operate at sea more than three aircraft.

ARTICLE 9

The rules as to replacement contained in Annex I to this Part II are applicable to vessels of war not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement, with the exception of aircraft carriers, whose replacement is governed by the provisions of the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 10

Within one month after the date of laying down and the date of completion respectively of each vessel of war, other than capital ships, aircraft carriers and the vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8, laid down or completed by or for them after the coming into force of the present Treaty, the High Contracting Parties shall communicate to each of the other High Contracting Parties the information detailed below:—

- (a) The date of laying the keel and the following particulars:—
 - Classification of the vessel;
 - Standard displacement in tons and metric tons;
 - Principal dimensions, namely: length at water-line, extreme beam at or below water-line;
 - mean draft at standard displacement;
 - calibre of the largest gun.

(b) The date of completion together with the foregoing particulars relating to the vessel at that date.

The information to be given in the case of capital ships and aircraft carriers is governed by the Washington Treaty.

ARTICLE 11

Subject to the provisions of Article 2 of the present Treaty, the rules for disposal contained in Annex II to this Part II shall be applied to all vessels of war to be disposed of under the said Treaty, and to aircraft carriers as defined in Article 3.

ARTICLE 12

1. Subject to any supplementary agreements which may modify, as between the High Contracting Parties concerned, the lists in Annex III to this Part II, the special vessels shown therein may be retained and their tonnage shall not be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

2. Any other vessel constructed, adapted or acquired to serve the purposes for which these special vessels are retained shall be charged against the tonnage of the appropriate combatant category, according to the characteristics of the vessel, unless such vessel conforms to the characteristics of vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8.

3. Japan may, however, replace the minelayers "Aso" and "Tokiwa" by two new minelayers before the 31st December, 1936. The standard displacement of each of the new vessels shall not exceed 5,000 tons (5,080 metric tons); their speed shall not exceed twenty knots, and their other characteristics shall conform to the provisions of paragraph (b) of Article 8. The new vessels shall be regarded as special vessels and their tonnage shall not be chargeable to the tonnage of any combatant category. The "Aso" and "Tokiwa" shall be disposed of in accordance with Section I or II of Annex II to this Part II, on completion of the replacement vessels.

4. The "Asama", "Yakumo", "Izumo", "Iwate" and "Kasuga" shall be disposed of in accordance with Section I or II of Annex II to this Part II when the first three vessels of the "Kuma" class have been replaced by new vessels. These three vessels of the "Kuma" class shall be reduced to the condition prescribed in Section V, sub-paragraph (b) 2 of Annex II to this Part II, and are to be used for training ships, and their tonnage shall not thereafter be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

ARTICLE 13

Existing ships of various types, which prior to the 1st April, 1930, have been used as stationary training establishments or hulks, may be retained in a non-seagoing condition.

ANNEX I.

Rules for replacement.

Section I.—Except as provided in Section III of this Annex and Part III of the present Treaty, a vessel shall not be replaced before it becomes "over-age." A vessel shall be deemed to be "over-age" when the following number of years have elapsed since the date of its completion:

(a) For a surface vessel exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) but not exceeding 10,000 tons (10,160 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) if laid down before the 1st January, 1920: 16 years;

(ii) if laid down after the 31st December, 1919: 20 years.

(b) For a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement:

(i) if laid down before the 1st January, 1921: 12 years;

(ii) if laid down after the 31st December, 1920: 16 years.

(c) For a submarine: 13 years.

The keels of replacement tonnage shall not be laid down more than three years before the year in which the vessel to be replaced becomes "over-age"; but this period is reduced to two years in the case of any replacement surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement.

The right of replacement is not lost by delay in laying down replacement tonnage.

Section II.—Except as otherwise provided in the present Treaty, the vessel or vessels, whose retention would cause the maximum tonnage permitted in the category to be exceeded, shall, on the completion or acquisition of replacement tonnage, be disposed of in accordance with Annex II to this Part II.

Section III.—In the event of loss or accidental destruction a vessel may be immediately replaced.

ANNEX II.

Rules for disposal of Vessels of War.

The present Treaty provides for the disposal of vessels of war in the following ways:

(i) by scrapping (sinking or breaking up);

(ii) by converting the vessel to a hulk;

(iii) by converting the vessel to target use exclusively;

(iv) by retaining the vessel exclusively for experimental purposes;

(v) by retaining the vessel exclusively for training purposes.

Any vessel of war to be disposed of, other than a capital ship, may either be scrapped or converted to a hulk at the option of the High Contracting Party concerned.

Vessels, other than capital ships, which have been retained for target, experimental or training purposes, shall finally be scrapped or converted to hulks.

Section I.—*Vessels to be scrapped.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by scrapping, by reason of its replacement, must be rendered incapable of warlike service within six months of the date of the completion of its successor, or of the first of its successors if there are more than one. If, however, the completion of the new vessel or vessels be delayed, the work of rendering the old vessel incapable of warlike service shall, nevertheless, be completed within four and a half years from the date of laying the keel of the new vessel, or of the first of the new vessels; but should the new vessel, or any of the new vessels, be a surface vessel not exceeding 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement, this period is reduced to three and a half years.

(b) A vessel to be scrapped shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there shall have been removed and landed or else destroyed in the ship:

(1) all guns and essential parts of guns, fire control tops and revolving parts of all barbettes and turrets;

(2) all hydraulic or electric machinery for operating turrets;

(3) all fire control instruments and rangefinders;

(4) all ammunition, explosives, mines and mine rails;

(5) all torpedoes, war heads, torpedo tubes and training racks;

(6) all wireless telegraphy installations;

(7) all main propelling machinery, or alternatively the armoured conning tower and all side armour plates;

(8) all aircraft cranes, derricks, lifts and launching apparatus. All landing-on or flying-off platforms and decks, or alternatively all main propelling machinery;

(9) in addition, in the case of submarines, all main storage batteries, air compressor plants and ballast pumps.

(c) Scrapping shall be finally effected in either of the following ways within twelve months of the date on which the work of rendering the vessel incapable of warlike service is due for completion:

(1) permanent sinking of the vessel;

(2) breaking the vessel up; this shall always include the destruction or removal of all machinery, boilers and armour, and all deck, side and bottom plating.

Section II.—*Vessels to be converted to hulks.*

A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to a hulk shall be considered finally disposed of when the conditions prescribed in Section I, paragraph (b), have been complied with, omitting sub-paragraphs (6), (7) and (8), and when the following have been effected:

(1) mutilation beyond repair of all propellor shafts, thrust blocks, turbine gearing or main propelling motors, and turbines or cylinders of main engines;

(2) removal of propellor brackets;

(3) removal and breaking up of all aircraft lifts, and the removal of all aircraft cranes, derricks and launching apparatus.

The vessel must be put in the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

Section III.—*Vessels to be converted to target use.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to target use exclusively shall be considered incapable of warlike service when there have been removed and landed, or rendered unserviceable on board, the following:—

- (1) all guns;
- (2) all fire control tops and instruments and main fire control communication wiring;
- (3) all machinery for operating gun mountings or turrets;
- (4) all ammunition, explosives, mines, torpedoes and torpedo tubes;
- (5) all aviation facilities and accessories.

The vessel must be put into the above condition within the same limits of time as provided in Section I for rendering a vessel incapable of warlike service.

(b) In addition to the rights already possessed by each High Contracting Party under the Washington Treaty, each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain, for target use exclusively, at any time:

- (1) not more than three vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these three vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
- (2) one submarine.

(c) On retaining a vessel for target use, the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

Section IV.—*Vessels retained for experimental purposes.*

(a) A vessel to be disposed of by conversion to experimental purposes exclusively shall be dealt with in accordance with the provisions of Section III (a) of this Annex.

(b) Without prejudice to the general rules, and provided that due notice be given to the other High Contracting Parties reasonable variation from the conditions prescribed in Section III (a) of this Annex, in so far as may be necessary for the purposes of a special experiment, may be permitted as a temporary measure.

Any High Contracting Party taking advantage of this provision is required to furnish full details of any such variations and the period for which they will be required.

(c) Each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for experimental purposes exclusively at any one time:

- (1) not more than two vessels (cruisers or destroyers), but of these two vessels only one may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;
- (2) one submarine.

(d) The United Kingdom is allowed to retain, in their present conditions, the monitor "Roberts", the main armament guns and mountings of which have been mutilated, and the seaplane carrier "Ark Royal", until no longer required for experimental purposes. The retention of these two vessels is without prejudice to the retention of vessels permitted under (c) above.

(e) On retaining a vessel for experimental purposes the High Contracting Party concerned undertakes not to recondition it for warlike service.

Section V.—*Vessels retained for training purposes.*

(a) In addition to the rights already possessed by any High Contracting Party under the Washington Treaty, each High Contracting Party is permitted to retain for training purposes exclusively the following vessels:

United States: 1 capital ship ("Arkansas" or "Wyoming");

France: 2 surface vessels, one of which may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;

United Kingdom: 1 capital ship ("Iron Duke");

Italy: 2 surface vessels, one of which may exceed 3,000 tons (3,048 metric tons) standard displacement;

Japan: 1 capital ship ("Hiyei"), 3 cruisers ("Kuma" class).

(b) Vessels retained for training purposes under the provisions of paragraph (a) shall, within six months of the date on which they are required to be disposed of be dealt with as follows:

1. *Capital Ships.*

The following is to be carried out:

(1) removal of main armament guns, revolving parts of all barbetstes and turrets; machinery for operating turrets; but three turrets with their armament may be retained in each ship;

(2) removal of all ammunition and explosives in excess of the quantity required for target practice training for the guns remaining on board;

(3) removal of conning tower and the side armour belt between the foremost and aftermost barbetsettes;

(4) removal or mutilation of all torpedo tubes;

(5) removal or mutilation on board of all boilers in excess of the number required for a maximum speed of eighteen knots.

2. *Other surface vessels retained by France, Italy and Japan.*

The following is to be carried out:

(1) removal of one half of the guns, but four guns of main calibre may be retained on each vessel;

(2) removal of all torpedo tubes;

(3) removal of all aviation facilities and accessories;

(4) removal of one half of the boilers.

(c) The High Contracting Party concerned undertakes that vessels retained in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall not be used for any combatant purpose.

ANNEX III

Special Vessels

UNITED STATES

Name and type of vessel	Displacement Tons
Aroostook—Minelayer	4,950
Oglala—Minelayer	4,950
Baltimore—Minelayer	4,413
San Francisco—Minelayer	4,083
Cheyenne—Monitor	2,800
Helena—Gunboat	1,392
Isabel—Yacht	938
Niagara—Yacht	2,600
Bridgeport—Destroyer tender	11,750
Dobbin—Destroyer tender	12,450
Melville—Destroyer tender	7,150
Whitney—Destroyer tender	12,450
Holland—Submarine tender	11,570
Henderson—Naval transport	10,000

91,496

FRANCE

Name and type of vessel	Displacement Tons
Castor—Minelayer	3,150
Pollux—Minelayer	2,461
Commandant—Teste—Seaplane carrier	10,000
Aisne—Despatch vessel	600
Marne—Despatch vessel	600
Ancre—Despatch vessel	604
Scarpe—Despatch vessel	604
Suippe—Despatch vessel	604
Dunkerque—Despatch vessel	644
Laffaux—Despatch vessel	644
Bapaume—Despatch vessel	644
Nancy—Despatch vessel	644
Calais—Despatch vessel	644
Lassigny—Despatch vessel	644
Les Eparges—Despatch vessel	644
Remiremont—Despatch vessel	644
Tahure—Despatch vessel	644
Toul—Despatch vessel	644
Epinal—Despatch vessel	644
Liévin—Despatch vessel	644
(—)—Netlayer	2,293

28,644

BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS

Name and type of vessel	Displacement Tons
Adventure—Minelayer (United Kingdom)	6,740
Albatross—Seaplane carrier (Australia)	5,000
Erebus—Monitor (United Kingdom)	7,200
Terror—Monitor (United Kingdom)	7,200
Marshal Soult—Monitor (United Kingdom)	6,400
Clive—Sloop (India)	2,021
Medway—Submarine depot ship (United Kingdom)	15,000

49,561

ITALY

Name and type of vessel	Displacement Tons
Miraglia—Seaplane carrier	4,880
Faà di Bruno—Monitor	2,800
Monte Grappa—Monitor	605
Montello—Monitor	605
Monte Cengio—Ex-monitor	500
Monte Novogno—Ex-monitor	500
Campania—Sloop	2,070

11,960

JAPAN

Name and type of vessel	Displacement Tons
Aso—Minelayer	7,180
Tokiwa—Minelayer	9,240
Asama—Old cruiser	9,240
Yakumo—Old cruiser	9,010
Izumo—Old cruiser	9,180
Iwate—Old cruiser	9,180
Kasuga—Old cruiser	7,080
Yodo—Gunboat	1,320
	<hr/> 61,430

PART III

The President of the United States of America, His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the Emperor of Japan, have agreed as between themselves to the provisions of this Part III:

ARTICLE 14

The naval combatant vessels of the United States, the British Commonwealth of Nations and Japan, other than capital ships, aircraft carriers and all vessels exempt from limitation under Article 8, shall be limited during the term of the present Treaty as provided in this Part III, and, in the case of special vessels, as provided in Article 12.

ARTICLE 15

For the purpose of this Part III the definition of the cruiser and destroyer categories shall be as follows:

Cruisers

Surface vessels of war, other than capital ships or aircraft carriers, the standard displacement of which exceeds 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons), or with a gun above 5·1-inch (130 mm.) calibre.

The cruiser category is divided into two sub-categories, as follows:

- (a) cruisers carrying a gun above 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre;
- (b) cruisers carrying a gun not above 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre.

Destroyers

Surface vessels of war the standard displacement of which does not exceed 1,850 tons (1,880 metric tons), and with a gun not above 5·1-inch (130 mm.) calibre.

ARTICLE 16

1. The completed tonnage in the cruiser, destroyer and submarine categories which is not to be exceeded on the 31st December, 1936, is given in the following table:

Categories	United States	British Commonwealth of Nations	Japan
Cruisers			
(a) with guns of more than 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre.	180,000 tons (182,880 metric tons)	146,800 tons (149,149 metric tons)	108,400 tons (110,134 metric tons)
(b) with guns of 6.1-inch (155 mm.) calibre or less.	143,500 tons (145,796 metric tons)	192,200 tons (195,275 metric tons)	100,450 tons (102,057 metric tons)
Destroyers	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons)	105,500 tons (107,188 metric tons)
Submarines	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)	52,700 tons (53,543 metric tons)

2. Vessels which cause the total tonnage in any category to exceed the figures given in the foregoing table shall be disposed of gradually during the period ending on the 31st December, 1936.

3. The maximum number of cruisers of sub-category (a) shall be as follows: for the United States, eighteen; for the British Commonwealth of Nations, fifteen; for Japan, twelve.

4. In the destroyer category not more than sixteen per cent of the allowed total tonnage shall be employed in vessels of over 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement. Destroyers completed or under construction on the 1st April, 1930, in excess of this percentage may be retained, but no other destroyers exceeding 1,500 tons (1,524 metric tons) standard displacement shall be constructed or acquired until a reduction to such sixteen per cent has been effected.

5. Not more than twenty-five per cent of the allowed total tonnage in the cruiser category may be fitted with a landing-on platform or deck for aircraft.

6. It is understood that the submarines referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 will be counted as part of the total submarine tonnage of the High Contracting Party concerned.

7. The tonnage of any vessels retained under Article 13 or disposed of in accordance with Annex II to Part II of the present Treaty shall not be included in the tonnage subject to limitation.

ARTICLE 17

A transfer not exceeding ten per cent of the allowed total tonnage of the category or sub-category into which the transfer is to be made shall be permitted between cruisers of sub-category (b) and destroyers.

ARTICLE 18

The United States contemplates the completion by 1935 of fifteen cruisers of sub-category (a) of an aggregate tonnage of 150,000 tons (152,400 metric tons). For each of the three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a) which it is entitled to construct the United States may elect to substitute 15,166 tons (15,409 metric tons) of cruisers of sub-category (b). In case the United States shall construct one or more of such three remaining cruisers of sub-category (a), the sixteenth unit will not be laid down before 1933 and will not be completed before 1936; the seventeenth will not be laid down before 1934 and will not be completed before 1937; the eighteenth will not be laid down before 1935 and will not be completed before 1938.

ARTICLE 19

Except as provided in Article 20 the tonnage laid down in any category subject to limitation in accordance with Article 16 shall not exceed the amount necessary to reach the maximum allowed tonnage of the category, or to replace vessels that become "over-age" before the 31st December, 1936. Nevertheless, replacement tonnage may be laid down for cruisers and submarines that become "over-age" in 1937, 1938 and 1939, and for destroyers that become "over-age" in 1937 and 1938.

ARTICLE 20

Notwithstanding the rules for replacement contained in Annex I to Part II:

(a) The "Frobisher" and "Effingham" (United Kingdom) may be disposed of during the year 1936. Apart from the cruisers under construction on the 1st April, 1930, the total replacement tonnage of cruisers to be completed, in the case of the British Commonwealth of Nations, prior to the 31st December, 1936, shall not exceed 91,000 tons (92,456 metric tons).

(b) Japan may replace the "Tama" by new construction to be completed during the year 1936.

(c) In addition to replacing destroyers becoming "over-age" before the 31st December, 1936, Japan may lay down, in each of the years 1935 and 1936, not more than 5,200 tons (5,283 metric tons) to replace part of the vessels that become "over-age" in 1938 and 1939.

(d) Japan may anticipate replacement during the term of the present Treaty by laying down not more than 19,200 tons (19,507 metric tons) of submarine tonnage, of which not more than 12,000 tons (12,192 metric tons) shall be completed by the 31st December, 1936.

ARTICLE 21

If, during the term of the present Treaty, the requirements of the national security of any High Contracting Party in respect of vessels of war limited by Part III of the present Treaty are in the opinion of that Party materially affected by new construction of any Power other than those who have joined in Part III of this Treaty, that High Contracting Party will notify the other Parties to Part III as to the increase required to be made in its own tonnages within one or more of the categories of such vessels of war, specifying particularly the proposed increases and the reasons therefor, and shall be entitled to make such increase. Thereupon the other Parties to Part III of this Treaty shall be entitled to make a proportionate increase in the category or categories specified; and the said other Parties shall promptly advise with each other through diplomatic channels as to the situation thus presented.

PART IV

ARTICLE 22

The following are accepted as established rules of International Law:

(1) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the rules of International Law to which surface vessels are subject.

(2) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

The High Contracting Parties invite all other Powers to express their assent to the above rules.

PART V

ARTICLE 23

The present Treaty shall remain in force until the 31st December, 1936, subject to the following exceptions:

(1) Part IV shall remain in force without limit of time;

(2) the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, and of Article 11 and Annex II to Part II so far as they relate to aircraft carriers, shall remain in force for the same period as the Washington Treaty.

Unless the High Contracting Parties should agree otherwise by reason of a more general agreement limiting naval armaments, to which they all become parties, they shall meet in conference in 1935 to frame a new treaty to replace and to carry out the purposes of the present Treaty, it being understood that none of the provisions of the present Treaty shall prejudice the attitude of any of the High Contracting Parties at the conference agreed to.

ARTICLE 24

1. The present Treaty shall be ratified by the High Contracting Parties in accordance with their respective constitutional methods and the ratifications shall be deposited at London as soon as possible. Certified copies of all the *procès-verbaux* of the deposit of ratifications will be transmitted to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

2. As soon as the ratifications of the United States of America, of His Majesty the King of Great Britain, Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, in respect of each and all of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations as enumerated in the preamble of the present Treaty, and of His Majesty the Emperor of Japan have been deposited, the Treaty shall come into force in respect of the said High Contracting Parties.

On the date of the coming into force referred to in the preceding paragraph, Parts I, II, IV and V of the present Treaty will come into force in respect of the French Republic and the Kingdom of Italy if their ratifications have been deposited at that date; otherwise these Parts will come into force in respect of each of those Powers on the deposit of its ratification.

4. The rights and obligations resulting from Part III of the present Treaty are limited to the High Contracting Parties mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article. The High Contracting Parties will agree as to the date on which, and the conditions under which, the obligations assumed under the said Part III by the High Contracting Parties mentioned in paragraph 2 of this Article will bind them in relation to France and Italy; such agreement will determine at the same time the corresponding obligations of France and Italy in relation to the other High Contracting Parties.

ARTICLE 25

After the deposit of the ratifications of all the High Contracting Parties, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland will communicate the provisions inserted in Part IV of the present Treaty to all Powers which are not signatories of the said Treaty, inviting them to accede thereto definitely and without limit of time.

Such accession shall be effected by a declaration addressed to His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

ARTICLE 26

The present Treaty, of which the French and English texts are both authentic, shall remain deposited in the archives of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted to the Governments of all the High Contracting Parties.

In faith whereof the above-named Plenipotentiaries have signed the present Treaty and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done at London, the twenty-second day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty.

HENRY L. STIMSON.
CHARLES G. DAWES.
CHARLES F. ADAMS.
JOSEPH T. ROBINSON.
DAVID A. REED.
HUGH GIBSON.
DWIGHT W. MORROW.
ARISTIDE BRIAND.
J. L. DUMESNIL.
A. DE FLEURIAU.
J. RAMSAY MACDONALD,
ARTHUR HENDERSON.
A. V. ALEXANDER.
W. WEDGWOOD BENN.
PHILIPPE ROY.
JAMES E. FENTON.
T. M. WILFORD.
C. T. TE WATER.
T. A. SMIDDY.
ATUL C. CHATTERJEE.
G. SIRIANNI.
A. C. BORDONARO.
ALFREDO ACTON.
R. WAKATSUKI.
TAKESHI TAKARABE.
T. MATSUDAIRA.
M. NAGAI.

ANNEX B.

TEXT OF THE NOTES, SIGNED BY MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON, SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, DELIVERED BY THE BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO THE FRENCH, ITALIAN AND JAPANESE AMBASSADORS IN LONDON ON MONDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1929.

"Your Excellency:

"I have the honour to inform Your Excellency that the informal conversations on the subject of naval disarmament which have been proceeding in London during the last three months between the Prime Minister and the Ambassador of the United States have now reached a stage at which it is possible to say that there is no point outstanding of such serious importance as to prevent an agreement.

"From time to time the Prime Minister has notified Your Excellency of the progress made in these discussions and I now have the honour to state that provisional and informal agreement has been reached on the following principles:

"One. The conversations have been one of the results of the Treaty for the Renunciation of War signed at Paris in 1928 which brought about a realignment of our national attitudes on the subject of security in consequence of the provision that war should not be used as an instrument of national policy in the relations of nations one to another. Therefore the Peace Pact has been regarded as the starting point of agreement.

"Two. It has been agreed to adopt the principle of parity in each of the several categories and that such parity shall be reached by December 31, 1936. Consultation between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and His Majesty's Government in the Dominions has taken place and it is contemplated that the program of parity on the British side should be related to naval forces of all parts of the Empire.

"Three. The question of battleship strength was also touched upon during the conversations and it has been agreed in these conversations that subject to the assent of other signatory Powers it would be desirable to reconsider the battleship replacement programs provided for in the Washington Treaty of 1922 with the view of diminishing the amount of replacement construction implied under that Treaty.

"Four. Since both the Government of the United States and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom adhere to the attitude that they have publicly adopted in regard to the desirability of securing the total abolition of the submarine, this matter hardly gave rise to discussion during the recent conversations. They recognize, however, that no final settlement on this subject can be reached except in conference with the other naval Powers.

"In view of the scope of these discussions both Governments consider it most desirable that a Conference should be summoned to consider the categories not covered by the Washington Treaty and to arrange for and deal with the questions covered by the second paragraph of Article 21 of that Treaty. It is our earnest hope that the (blank) Government will agree to the desirability of such a Conference. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of the United States are in accord that such a Conference should be held in London at the beginning of the third week of January, 1930, and it is hoped that the (blank) Government will be willing to appoint representatives to attend it.

"A similar invitation is being addressed to the Governments of (blank) and the United States and His Majesty's Governments in the Dominions are being

asked to appoint representatives to take part in the Conference. I should be grateful if Your Excellency would cause the above invitation to be addressed to the (blank) Government.

"In the same way as the two Governments have kept Your Excellency informally au courant of the recent discussions, so now His Majesty's Government will be willing, in the interval before the proposed conference, to continue informal conversations with Your Excellency on any points which may require elucidation. The importance of reviewing the whole naval situation at an early date is so vital in the interests of general disarmament that I trust that Your Excellency's Government will see their way to accept this invitation and that the date proposed will be agreeable to them.

"His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes to communicate to you in due course their views as to the subjects which they think should be discussed at the Conference, and will be glad to receive a corresponding communication from the (blank) Government.

"It is hoped that at this Conference the principal naval Powers may be successful in reaching agreement. I should like to emphasize that His Majesty's Government have discovered no inclination in any quarter to set up new machinery for dealing with the naval disarmament question; on the contrary, it is hoped that by this means a text can be elaborated which will facilitate the task of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission and of the subsequent general disarmament conference."

ANNEX C.

JOINT STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT HOOVER AND MR. RAMSAY MACDONALD, OCTOBER 10, 1929.

The visit of the British Prime Minister to President Hoover, which is now terminated, had as its chief purpose the making of personal contacts which will be fruitful in promoting friendly and frank relations between the two countries. Both the President and the Prime Minister are highly gratified by the keen interest which the people of both countries have taken in the meeting, and regard it as proof of the strong desire of both nations to come to closer understanding. The British Prime Minister has been particularly impressed and gratified by the warmth of his welcome and the flood of expressions of goodwill which have poured upon him.

At the moment of leaving Washington the following joint statement was issued:—

"During the last few days we have had an opportunity, in the informal talks in which we have engaged, not only to review the conversations on a naval agreement which have been carried on during this summer between us, but also to discuss some of the more important means by which the moral force of our countries can be exerted for peace.

"We have been guided by the double hope of settling our own differences on naval matters and so establishing unclouded goodwill, candour and confidence between us, and also of contributing something to the solution of the problem of peace in which all other nations are interested and which calls for their co-operation.

"In signing the Paris Peace Pact, fifty-six nations have declared that war shall not be used as an instrument of national policy. We have agreed that all disputes shall be settled by pacific means. Both our Governments resolve to accept the Peace Pact not only as a declaration of good intentions but as a positive obligation to direct national policy in accordance with its pledge.

"The part of each of our Governments in the promotion of world peace will be different, as one will never consent to become entangled in European diplomacy, and the other is resolved to pursue a policy of active co-operation with its European neighbours; but each of our Governments will direct its thoughts and influence towards securing and maintaining the peace of the world.

"Our conversations have been largely confined to the mutual relations of the two countries in the light of the situation created by the signing of the Peace Pact. Therefore, in a new and reinforced sense, the two Governments not only declare that war between them is unthinkable, but that distrusts and suspicions arising from doubts and fears which may have been justified before the Peace Pact must now cease to influence national policy. We approach old historical problems from a new angle and in a new atmosphere. On the assumption that war between us is banished, and that conflicts between our military or naval forces cannot take place, these problems have changed their meaning and character, and their solution, in ways satisfactory to both countries, has become possible.

"We have agreed that those questions should become the subject of active consideration between us. They involve important technical matters requiring detailed study. One of the hopeful results of the visit which is now terminating officially has been that our two Governments will begin conversations upon them following the same method as that which has been pursued during the summer in London.

"The exchange of views on naval reduction has brought the two nations so close to agreement that the obstacles in previous conferences arising out of Anglo-American disagreements seem now substantially removed. We have kept the nations which took part in the Washington Naval Conference of 1922 informed of the progress of our conversations, and we have now proposed to them that we should all meet together and try to come to a common agreement which would justify each in making substantial naval reductions. An agreement on naval armaments cannot be completed without the co-operation of other naval Powers, and both of us feel sure that, by the same free and candid discussion of needs which has characterized our conversations, such mutual understandings will be reached as will make naval agreement next January possible, and thus remove this serious obstacle to the progress of world disarmament.

"Between now and the meeting of the proposed conference in January our Governments will continue conversations with the other Powers concerned, in order to remove as many difficulties as possible before the official and formal negotiations open.

"In view of the security afforded by the Peace Pact, we have been able to end, we trust for ever, all competitive building between ourselves, with the risk of war and the waste of public money involved, by agreeing to a parity of fleets, category by category.

"Success at the coming conference will result in a large decrease in the naval equipment of the world, and, what is equally important, the reduction of prospective programmes of construction which would otherwise produce competitive building to an indefinite amount.

"We hope and believe that the steps we have taken will be warmly welcomed by the people whom we represent as a substantial contribution to the efforts universally made by all nations to gain security for peace—not by military organization, but by peaceful means rooted in public opinion and enforced by a sense of justice in the civilized world."

ANNEX D.

MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATIONS OF THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH OF NATIONS
(NOT INCLUDING CANADA)

COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA

1. *Delegate.*

The Honourable J. E. Fenton, M.P.,
Minister for Trade and Customs.

2. *Expert Advisers.*

Vice-Admiral William R. Napier, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Formerly First Naval Member of the Commonwealth Naval Board.
Rear-Admiral George F. Hyde, C.V.O., C.B.E., R.A.N.
Captain Henry P. Cayley, R.A.N.,
Representative in Great Britain of the Commonwealth Naval Board.
Major R. G. Casey, D.S.O., M.C.,
Liaison officer in London.

3. *Secretary.*

Mr. William Duffy.

GREAT BRITAIN

1. *Delegates.*

The Right Honourable J. Ramsay MacDonald, M.P.,
Prime Minister and First Lord of the Treasury.
The Right Honourable Arthur Henderson, M.P.,
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
The Right Honourable W. Wedgwood Benn, D.S.O., D.F.C., M.P.,
Secretary of State for India.
The Right Honourable A. V. Alexander, M.P.,
First Lord of the Admiralty.

2. *Foreign Office Expert Advisers.*

Sir Robert G. Vansittart, K.C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.,
Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
Mr. H. W. Malkin, C.B., C.M.G.,
Legal Adviser to the Foreign Office.
Mr. R. L. Craigie, C.M.G.,
Head of the American Department. Personally attached to the
Prime Minister.
The Honourable A. M. G. Cadogan, C.M.G.,
Adviser on League of Nations Affairs.

3. *Admiralty Expert Advisers and Assistants to Advisers.*

Admiral of the Fleet Sir Charles E. Madden, Bt., G.C.B., G.C.V.O.,
K.C.M.G.,
First Sea Lord and Chief of Naval Staff.
Vice-Admiral Sir William W. Fisher, K.C.B., C.V.O.,
Deputy Chief of Naval Staff.
Vice-Admiral R. C. Backhouse, C.B., C.M.G.,
Third Sea Lord and Controller.
Captain Roger M. Bellairs, C.M.G., R.N.,
Director of Plans Division. Personally attached to First Lord.
Vice-Admiral D. M. Anderson, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O.,
Liaison officer.

Captain E. L. S. King, M.V.O., R.N.,
 Assistant Director of Plans Division.
 Commander C. J. L. Bittleston, D.S.C.,
 Plans Division.
 Lieut.-Colonel A. G. B. Bourne, D.S.O., M.V.O., R.M.,
 Plans Division.
 Mr. Alex Flint, C.B., C.M.G.,
 Principal Assistant Secretary (Staff) Admiralty.

4. *Dominions Office.*

Sir H. F. Batterbee, K.C.V.O., C.M.G.,
 Assistant Secretary, Dominions Office.
 Mr. C. R. Price,
 Principal, Dominions Office. Liaison officer.

5. *Treasury.*

Mr. G. C. Upcott, C.B.,
 Deputy Controller of Supply Services.

6. *Secretaries and Personal Staffs.*

Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, M.P.,
 Personally attached to Prime Minister.
 Mr. P. Noel Baker, M.P.,
 Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for
 Foreign Affairs.
 Mr. W. W. Henderson, M.P.,
 Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for India.
 Mr. J. J. Tinker, M.P.,
 Parliamentary Private Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Mr. T. Fry,
 Private Secretary to the First Lord of the Admiralty.
 Mr. G. H. Thompson,
 Second Secretary in the Foreign Office. Personally attached to the
 Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 Mr. F. R. Hoyer Miller,
 Second Secretary in the Foreign Office. Personally attached to the
 Secretary-General.
 Mr. R. M. Makins,
 Third Secretary in the Foreign Office. Personally attached to the
 Secretary of State for India.

7. *Press Officers.*

Sir Arthur Willert, K.B.E.,
 Head of News Department, Foreign Office.
 Mr. G. F. Steward, O.B.E.,
 News Department, Foreign Office.

8. *Delegation Secretariat.*

(i) Secretary.

Colonel Sir Maurice Hankey, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.,
 Secretary to the Cabinet and the Committee of Imperial Defence.

(ii) Assistant Secretaries.

Commander L. E. H. Maund, R.N.,
 Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
 Squadron Leader E. J. Hodsohl, R.A.F.,
 Assistant Secretary, Committee of Imperial Defence.
 Captain L. F. Burgis, C.M.G., M.V.O.,
 Private Secretary to the Secretary of the Cabinet and the Com-
 mittee of Imperial Defence.

INDIA

1. *Delegate.*

Sir Atul C. Chatterjee, K.C.I.E.,
High Commissioner for India in London.

2. *Expert Adviser.*

Commander H. L. Davis, R.I.M.

3. *Secretary.*

Mr. K. Anderson,
India Office.

IRISH FREE STATE

1. *Delegate.*

Professor T. A. Smiddy,
High Commissioner for the Irish Free State in London.

NEW ZEALAND

1. *Delegate.*

Mr. T. M. Wilford, K.C.,
High Commissioner for New Zealand in London.

2. *Liaison officer.*

Commander A. W. S. Agar, V.C., D.S.O.

3. *Secretary.*

Mr. M. C. Knowles,
Private Secretary to the High Commissioner.

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA

1. *Delegate.*

Mr. C. T. te Water,
High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

3. *Secretaries.*

Mr. J. G. Hubball,
Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

Mr. R. Webster,
Acting Political Secretary, Office of the High Commissioner for the Union of South Africa in London.

ANNEX E.

SPEECH OF THE CANADIAN DELEGATE AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE.

Mr. Chairman: For the Dominion of Canada I humbly thank His Majesty for his gracious welcome.

The eloquent words to which we have just listened have emphasized, I know, the satisfaction which is everywhere apparent that His Majesty has honoured this occasion, and signally marked it, by His Royal Presence and His memorable and gracious speech.

And while His Majesty's participation is welcomed by all the nations represented here, I know that it is received by the nations of the British Commonwealth with peculiar pleasure. Each has its separate sphere and authority; there is no subordination among ourselves, but the allegiance and loyalty which each bears to the Crown in the person of His Majesty are the living expression of the tie which unites this great Commonwealth.

And let me add this, that nowhere in the Empire could the devotion and affection to our Sovereign be greater than in Canada, where the descendants of two great races, with those who come from time to time to our shores, have united to develop and to foster a nationality which rests for its harmony, its tolerance and its assurance of liberty on the freedom and security which is guaranteed by the British Crown.

Canada comes here, Mr. Chairman, with no assumption of undue prominence or importance. Canada hopes particularly for the opportunity to be useful and helpful to all those who really bear the burden of this great event. She is fully conscious that she is so situated as to be spared, in some degree, the anxiety which is felt by other nations with regard to security. At the same time she has, when the need arose, assumed what she conceived to be her national responsibility and has shared with other nations of the world in full measure the bitter experiences of war.

Our Dominion is in close accord with the development in world affairs which has been referred to by the Chairman so appropriately this morning, which looks not wholly toward armament for security, but also toward machinery which forestalls the necessity for force by disposing of differences on the basis of discussion and reason; and if her experience, and perhaps intimate experience, can be put to any service in the deliberations of this Conference, she gladly tenders it for that purpose.

And so, Mr. Chairman, Canada unites with all the nations assembled here in earnest and fervent hope that definite and practical results may be achieved concerning the questions which confront this Conference.

May I add, that those hopes are intensified and animated by this thought, that a successful outcome of this Conference will be received by an anxious world as evidence of a genuine determination to work out ways and means, for the pacific settlement of international disputes; for, after all, that ultimate achievement and that high enterprise is the supreme business to which we, with the other nations of the world, have pledged unalterably our national honour and our joint endeavour.

ANNEX F.

SPEECH OF THE RT. HON. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD AT THE OPENING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE

I am both honoured and obliged by my fellow Delegates asking me to occupy the position of Chairman of this Conference. All I can say to my fellow Delegates is that I shall do my very best to facilitate your business and to win your approval of my impartiality.

The gracious speech to which we have just listened both conveys to you the hearty welcome of this country and also expresses the hope, which the people of every nation share, that our labours here may be crowned with success. It is peculiarly appropriate, and is the cause of most ardent satisfaction to us, that this should be the occasion of His Majesty's first public speech since his recent illness, and I venture to offer him in your name our most hearty thanks and congratulations.

Every country to-day wealthy and poverty-stricken alike—feels the burden of arms, dreads their competitive development, doubts the value of the security which they give, and would like to escape from their influence and their power. And yet, as has been shown again and again, the difficulties in the way are manifold. All, however, come mainly from one source—a lack of confidence. The spirit of doubt whispers: “There will be *some* State which will refuse to

carry out its obligations to the community of peaceful States; the machinery of arbitration will break down *somewhere* and *somehow*; do what we may, a situation will arise one day when a deadlock of *some* kind will have to be faced, and there will be but one remaining method, the old-fashioned one of a fight." Thus a habit of mind, nurtured by the experience of many generations, controls our thinking and our action, casts a shiver of hesitancy over all our peace efforts, and prevents a great change in our attitude to militarism as a means of national security. As a matter of fact, the generations of experience, which fear uses to pen us up in the spellbound fastnesses of militarism, ought by their failures to enlighten us so that we break the spell and seek for peace and security by other means. That will come. How marvellously slow it has been. How easy it is to retard the progress of States when old habit can be enlisted to fight enlightened reason.

The whole world, it may be said with almost literal accuracy, is turning its eyes upon us to-day. It expects that we shall deliberate and negotiate on the assumption that, having put our names to Pacts of Peace, we mean to respect our signatures. It prays that we shall not only relieve it of burdens, but establish it still more securely in the ways of peace. It begs us to give public opinion a chance, and to lift our problem out of the narrower scrutiny of the technical expert and put it on to the broader field of the creative statesman. Above all, it demands from us an agreement to stop the competition which has recently begun to show itself both in types and numbers of ships. If we are not careful we shall be once more involved in a feverish competition such as preceded the outbreak of the recent war.

At the same time, if the Conference and its work are to be justly judged, some appreciation must be shown of the nature of its tasks. Since 1919 the securing of peace has occupied much of the attention of the nations and very considerable progress has been made. The League of Nations steadily builds up its authority and in various clauses of its Covenant provides mutual security to well-doers and menaces to evil-doers amongst nations. The Peace Pact, signed at Paris in 1928, which, though lacking in machinery, except that which the Covenant supplies for members of the League, is, nevertheless, a mighty moral bulwark against war—and we must never underestimate the effectiveness of moral bulwarks with no bayonet nor bludgeon behind them. The entry of the United States into the Permanent Court of International Justice, the growing confidence in the Court, and the increase in the number of nations who have signed the Optional Clause, mark definite and, I believe, irrevocable steps in the displacement of military power by judicial process in the settlement of international disputes. Public servants like us will fail in our duty if we do not diminish military power in proportion to the increase of political security. On the other hand, no one can say that an absolute security for peace and justice has yet been found. There are risks on whichever side one leans. But I take it that the practical view is that political securities must determine the amount of military preparation; that excessive military preparation is, not only a wasteful use of national resources, but a weakening of political security; that the military preparation which any one nation feels to be necessary at any given moment must be determined, to a considerable degree, by the military preparation of other nations, so that no nation is free, *except by international agreement*, to pursue a policy of disarmament beyond certain rigidly defined limits. Steps toward disarmament must be international agreements; the agreements (whatever language is used or figures inserted in them) must not menace the freedom of other nations; they should be subject to review at reasonably frequent intervals, so that the political movements towards security may be used for a policy of progressive approach to disarmament.

This Conference has therefore to value the securities now afforded to the nations by the political guarantees I have referred to, and agree mutually upon how far they can, on the assumption of a continuing peace, reduce arms. I dare affirm that, in the naval programs of the leading naval powers, there is a margin between real security needs and actual or projected strengths, and the world expects this Conference to eliminate that margin.

It will both smooth and shorten our work perhaps, if we would assume two things in our discussions. The first is that we have different needs imposed upon us by geographical position, world responsibility, points of attack in the event of war. Conferences have broken down because there has been an unwillingness, or an inability, to understand that this is so; that, therefore, a ton used in ships for one purpose is a totally different thing from a ton used in ships for another purpose. I know that the plea of "need" can be stretched almost to infinity, and that in it lurks danger, but if peace is in our hearts, and a reduction of armaments in our minds, the substance of what constitutes "need" can be fairly admitted by each of us as regards the others, and can be satisfied in the form and the provisions of an agreement, and the Conference be a conspicuous success.

The second thing which we might assume is this. Although armaments cannot be divided into watertight compartments—Naval, Land and Air forces—for practical purposes we must discuss them separately, always remembering, when coming to our conclusions regarding each arm, that it has a relationship to the other two. If we are willing to make a good naval agreement now, when it comes to be reviewed again a few years hence, our attitude will depend upon what other Powers have done as regards land and air armaments in the meantime. All the nations have not the same interest in each arm, but they have all an interest in the general armed state of the world. The way of Great Britain is on the sea, for it is a small island. The stock of its people came dashing across the sea; its defence and its highroads have been the sea; its flag is a flag of the sea. Our Navy is no mere superfluity to us. It is us. So if this country can make a contribution to peace which will be one of deeds as well as of words, it must be as a Naval Power. That is why last June, after several attempts had been made unsuccessfully to get such an understanding between the United States and ourselves as would make a wide international agreement possible, President Hoover, through his newly appointed Ambassador in London, proposed to me that we should explore our differences once more and that, if we could overcome what had hitherto defied us, we might ask the Naval Powers which had taken part in the Washington Conference in 1921 and 1922 to meet again to try and agree upon an equilibrium in strengths, end competitive building, reduce expenditure on ships and bring fleets down in size, and, as a result, present to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission sitting at Geneva, an agreement which can be related to its wider work and form part of the material which will ultimately go before a general Disarmament Conference.

This was the sole purpose of our conversations and journeyings; that is why we are here. This place and that where we are to meet subsequently—St. James's Palace—has seen many great gatherings come and part, many deeds done, which history guards with zealous pride and watchful memory. It may well be that this Conference, which has been so auspiciously opened this morning by His Majesty, will be destined to rank with the most memorable and the most beneficial of them all. If we can limit and reduce by agreement one of our most powerful arms without diminishing national security but indeed strengthen it by that very act, the London Naval Conference of 1930 will undoubtedly take its place amongst the great landmarks which tell the stages and events by which mankind has advanced in wisdom and enlightenment.

ANNEX G.

COMMUNICATION ADDRESSED BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE CONFERENCE TO THE
SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS.

21st April, 1930.

The SECRETARY-GENERAL,
League of Nations,
Geneva.

SIR,—In its resolution voted on the 24th September last, the Assembly of the League of Nations cordially welcomed "the prospect of an early agreement between the naval Powers with a view to the reduction and limitation of naval armaments, which agreement may enable the Preparatory Commission to secure general agreement on the methods to be adopted for the reduction and limitation of naval armaments."

As regards those armaments, the work of the Preparatory Commission was checked by the difference of opinion on the methods of limitation, which arose between various delegations, two opposing proposals being incorporated in draft conventions submitted by the French and United Kingdom delegations respectively. The attempts to reach a compromise between the two drafts at the session of the Preparatory Commission in April, 1927, and at subsequent negotiations, remained in the end without result.

I am glad to inform you that at the Conference which has just ended the British and French Delegations had the satisfaction of reaching agreement to adopt a common method of limitation, and I invite your attention to the First Report of the First Committee which contains full particulars, together with the suggested method of indicating naval strengths in tabular form.

On account of the reservations which certain delegations attached to their acceptance of the report, and which are shown in the Report of the First Committee, the London Conference considered that it should limit itself to taking note of that paper, without actually accepting it. You will observe that the Italian Delegation entered a general reservation which is on record.

As far as three of the High Contracting Parties to the London Naval Treaty are concerned, the agreement, which they have arrived at on the question of tonnage, has been so drawn up as to make it consistent with the scheme of limitation referred to in the First Committee's Report.

Part II of the London Naval Treaty records, on the other hand, records the agreement arrived at by all the High Contracting Parties represented at the Conference on the question of the limitation of the displacement of submarines, and the calibre of the guns mounted, the definition of the vessels to which the rules for limitation do not apply, rules for replacement and scrapping, and finally a list of vessels, which, while not conforming to the characteristics of exempt vessels, should not be included when determining total tonnage.

Thus the London Naval Conference represents an advance made on the results heretofore achieved in this particular field. It is our earnest hope that the Preparatory Commission will find in the results of our work a contribution which will have the effects of facilitating its future labours.

In expressing this hope, I beg to forward to you, together with the text of the London Treaty, the Minutes of the Plenary sittings and the Reports of the Conference Committees, and I would ask you kindly to communicate them to the Chairman and to the Members of the Preparatory Commission.

I am, sir,

Your obedient servant,

(Sgd.) J. RAMSAY MACDONALD.

ANNEX H.

POSITION AT THE CONFERENCE OF VARIOUS DELEGATIONS.

Statement of Henry L. Stimson, Chairman of the American Delegation, February 6, 1930.

At the opening of the Conference the United States Delegation made no statement of its position of the needs of its country beyond the historical fact of the agreement in principle for parity between Great Britain and the United States. We are now in a position where we can go further. Following discussions among ourselves and negotiations with the British and Japanese which have clarified the limits of possible agreement our Delegation has made suggestions as follows:—

First, with Great Britain immediate parity in every class of ship in the navy. The gross tonnage of these two fleets is substantially 1,200,000 tons apiece. The negotiations between President Hoover and Prime Minister MacDonald last summer practically reduced the discussion of parity between them to the comparatively insignificant difference in their respective cruiser class tonnage of 24,000 tons. We propose to settle this difference as follows: Under our suggestion the actual tonnage difference between the two cruiser fleets will be only 12,000 tons. Of the larger cruisers armed with eight-inch guns Great Britain will have 15 and the United States 18, an advantage to the latter of 30,000 tons. Of the smaller cruisers armed with six-inch guns, Great Britain will have an advantage of 42,000 tons. But beyond this, in order to insure exact equality of opportunity the United States makes the suggestion that each country will have the option of duplicating exactly the cruiser fleet of the other. Thus Great Britain would have the option, by reducing its number of small cruisers, to increase its large cruisers 15 to 18 so as to give it a total tonnage of 327,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the United States now asks. On the other hand, the United States would have the option, by reducing its large cruisers from 18 to 15, to increase the number of its small cruisers so as to give it a total cruiser tonnage of 339,000 tons, the exact amount of tonnage which the British now ask.

In battleships we suggest by reduction in numbers on both sides to equalize our two fleets in 1931 instead of in 1942. At present the British battleship fleet contains two more vessels than ours. In destroyers and aircraft carriers we suggest equality in tonnage and in submarines the lowest tonnage possible. As is well known we will gladly agree to a total abolition of submarines if it is possible to obtain the consent of all five powers to such a proposition, and in any event we suggest that the operations of submarines be limited to the same rules of international law as surface craft in operation against merchant ships so that they cannot attack without providing for the safety of the passengers and crew.

Second, our suggestion to the Japanese would produce an over-all relation satisfactory to us and, we hope, to them. In conformity with our relations in the past it is not based upon the same ratio in every class of ships.

We have not made proposals to the French and Italians whose problems are not so directly related to ours that we feel it appropriate at this time to make suggestions to them. A settlement of the Italian and French problem is essential, of course, to the agreement contemplated.

The United States Delegates do not feel at liberty to discuss any further details in figures, and it is obvious that the announcement of hypothetical figures by others is calculated only to provoke argument.

Our Delegation is in agreement on every item of our program and we are in the most hopeful spirit that in co-operation with the other delegations the primary purposes of the Conference, namely, the termination and prevention of competition in naval armament and such reductions as are found consistent with national security, may be accomplished.

This is all that we deem it helpful to state until our suggestions have been considered by the Delegations to whom they have been sent.

Statement by the French Delegation

February 12, 1930.

In transmitting the four attached Tables, the French Delegation thinks it desirable also to transmit the following observations with regard to them:—

I

In view of the importance which it attaches to the principles of interdependence between armaments, the French Delegation emphasises, once more, that no final decision with regard to the fixing of the level of naval armaments can be taken without, at the same time, considering what solution may be found for the problem of the limitation of land and air armaments.

Consequently, and in conformity with its Memorandum of December 20, 1929, the French Government would be glad to reach agreement with the British Government with regard to the attitude that the representatives of their respective countries should adopt at Geneva.

II

The French Delegation recalls, moreover, that France has effected a marked reduction in her naval strength as compared with the pre-war period.

In 1914, it had a fleet of 964,500 English tons, in commission and building, together with 174,800 English tons authorized for building, that is to say, a total of 1,139,300 English tons. At the present time, she has a fleet, in commission and building, or authorized, of 681,808 English tons.

Alone, moreover, among the leading maritime nations, France in 1929 had a naval budget 18 per cent lower than its pre-war budget.

The program adopted in 1924 by the French Government, which has since been carried into effect in annual quotas, shows a reduction of 339,000 tons as compared with 1913. France has, therefore, acting in the same spirit as Great Britain, effected a marked reduction in her program without awaiting any decisions taken by the present Conference.

III

If the Powers represented at the Conference are to take the drawing up of the 1930-36 programs as the basis of their agreement, France would be ready to adopt this course, the figures it would claim being those indicated in the attached Tables, with the double reservation that corresponding decisions are taken by the other four Powers, and that the ratification of the French Chamber is secured.

It will be seen that France will achieve this end by concentrating 82 per cent of her activities upon the replacement of obsolete vessels and only 18 per cent upon the construction of new vessels.

IV

With regard to Capital Ships, the French Delegation would point out that France has not exercised her right to build, prior to 1930, the 70,000 tons representing the replacement tonnage for the "France" lost in 1922, and also for the "Jean Bart" and the "Courbet" which, under the Washington Treaty, might be scrapped in 1930.

France is compelled, on account of the appearance of a new type of capital ship, to employ a part of this credit of 70,000 tons in laying down a capital ship, the displacement of which will, she hopes, be as small as possible, and which will be armed with 12-inch (305 m/m) guns. She might even find it necessary to lay down, before January 1, 1937, the entire credit of the 70,000 tons mentioned above, should new vessels of the same type be constructed.

Should a naval holiday in capital shipbuilding until 1936 be proposed, France would be ready to agree to such a holiday, in principle, with the sole reservation which has just been made, and which is based upon a right that existed prior to the assembling of the Conference.

Table No. 1

STATUT NAVAL

Global Tonnage and Distribution of this Tonnage as provided for in the Statute

Global tonnage: 800,000 tons (2,240 lbs.)

<i>Capital Ships</i>	175,000
<i>Aircraft Carriers</i>	60,000
<i>Cruisers No. 1</i> with guns of between 155 (exclusive) and 203 (inclusive)	390,000
<i>Cruisers No. 2</i> with guns of a calibre of 155 or less	
<i>Destroyers and Torpedo Boats</i>	125,200
<i>Ocean-going Submarines</i> , mine-laying <i>Submarines</i> , coastal defence <i>Submarines</i>	
<i>Special Vessels</i>	50,000
	800,000

Table No. 2

FLEET ON JANUARY 1, 1930

Vessels in commission, building or for which credits have been voted.

This total has been drawn up on the assumption that special vessels will be distributed among the other classes.

<i>Capital Ships</i>	Tons (2,240 lbs.)	
(a) Subject to the Washington Regulations	133,136	
(b) Not subject to the Washington Regulations (3 "Diderot")	52,791	
<i>Cruisers</i> of 10,000 tons Washington	70,000	136,963
<i>Old Cruisers</i> carrying guns of a calibre exceeding 155 mm.	66,963	
<i>Cruisers</i> carrying guns of a calibre of 155 mm. or less, later than 1922 (including 1 training cruiser and 2 mine-layers)	38,902	228,897
prior to 1922	25,625	
<i>Destroyers and Torpedo Boats</i> (including sloops, 2 small mine-layers and 1 net-layer)		32,146
later than 1922	109,490	
prior to 1922	54,880	
<i>Aircraft-Carriers</i> (including a seaplane carrier)		32,146
<i>Submarines</i>		
later than 1922	75,911	97,875
prior to 1922	21,964	
		681,808

Table No. 3

Constitution of the Fleet which may be anticipated for December 31, 1936.

VESSELS ON COMMISSION

The tonnage building which will be placed on commission after this date is set off by the scrapping ton per ton of an equal tonnage in obsolete vessels.

It has been assumed that special vessels will be distributed among the other categories, and that a capital ship, the displacement of which would be agreed upon, will be built. For the purposes of this table, it has been assumed that this displacement would be between 20,000 and 25,000 tons. This capital ship would be built, without corresponding scrapping, in replacement of the battleship "France."

	Tons (2,240 lbs.)
<i>Capital Ships:—</i>	
(a) Subject to the Washington regulations.. . . .	156,466
(b) Not subject to the Washington regulations.. . . .	52,791
<i>Cruisers</i> of 10,000 tons Washington.. . . .	100,000
<i>Old Cruisers</i> carrying guns of a calibre exceeding 155 mm.. . . .	24,850
<i>Light Vessels</i> (cruisers carrying guns of a calibre of 155 mm. or less —destroyers, etc.).. . . .	258,597
<i>Aircraft Carriers</i>	32,146
<i>Submarines</i>	99,629
	<hr/> 724,479

Observations

Tonnage to be placed on commission between 1934 and 1936: 120,970 tons.
Tonnage scrapped between 1930 and 1936: 78,299 tons.

Table No. 4

FLEET ON AUGUST 1, 1914

(*Vessels in commission, building, or for which credits had been voted*)

	Tons (2,240 lbs.)
Battleships.. . . .	736,787
Cruisers.. . . .	308,030
Torpedo boats.. . . .	57,698
Submarines.. . . .	35,547
Special Vessels.. . . .	1,244
	<hr/> 1,139,306

Memorandum on the Position at the London Naval Conference, 1930, of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.

LONDON, February 7, 1930.

PART I

1. The policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom is to keep the highway of the seas open for trade and communication, and, in relation to the political state of the world, to take what steps are necessary to secure this.

2. The Government is directing its policy to secure this by co-operating with the League of Nations, making friendly compacts with other nations, strengthening the International Courts, accepting arbitration in international disputes, honouring the Peace Pact of Paris, and otherwise aiding in tranquillising the world. Whilst it believes that the result of that policy will be ultimately to eliminate the causes of war and establish peace on an unassailable foundation, it recognizes that there must be a time of transition which will be marked by a steady decline in the importance and amount of armaments of all kinds, ending in disarmament.

3. The transition time should be marked by efforts to carry the security against war afforded by political and judicial agreements further and further and to mark progress by disarmament treaties.

For this reason the Government considers the London Naval Conference of supreme importance, and believes that it ought to put an end finally to competition in naval armaments and reduce existing fleets and building programs.

4. In estimating what fleet is required the Government has also to take account of the obligations which the country has undertaken in consequence of the terms of the Covenant of the League of Nations (partly offset, though they are, by the pooled security afforded under the Covenant by its provision of mutual support), and other commitments which it has inherited and which it has to fulfil in relation to the present condition of the world. In deciding what these amount to in terms of naval strength, the Government must estimate the chances of war breaking out because, if this is not done, fleets will be built which will never be of any use, but which will threaten rather than protect and at best will be a waste of national resources.

5. The Government takes the view that, if the strengths of national fleets are not to be a menace, they must be the subject of international agreements, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium. This equilibrium will not be secured by mere numerical equality in ships and tonnage—which may indeed be a condition of serious inequality from the point of view of effectiveness—but by agreed programs which will be based on considerations of requirements affecting dispersion, etc., and in which menace will be reduced as much as possible. For this, there can be no general formula or ratio. It must be the subject of agreements made from time to time at Conferences such as this.

6. As the political conditions determining world security are not fixed, agreements should be made for periods at the end of which they should be reviewed and during which Governments should be engaged in strengthening the foundations of peace.

7. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the general agreement should run till 1936, and that in 1935 a further conference should be called to review the situation in relation to world conditions. Governments will be asked, at the present Conference, to agree to make all adjustments necessary in their programs and existing strengths by a date to be fixed before the end of 1936, and it will be suggested that the Conference in 1935 should deal with the situation after 1936.

PART II

With these considerations and aims in mind His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom makes the following proposals for the consideration of the Conference:—

(1) It believes that an agreement should not only be upon total fleet tonnage (global tonnage), but upon the size of individual ships in the various recognized fleet categories and the amount of tonnage which nations use in each of the categories. The categories should be those in general use amongst naval Powers to-day: capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines.

An agreement by categories is essential to obtain certain conditions of security, such as the elimination of competitive building and the maintenance of the equilibrium between national fleet and national fleet. It is not only the gross tonnage of a fleet which counts, but the use to which the tons are put, and an agreement on the latter is required.

(2) At the same time, whilst an agreement upon category totals is essential to establish the feeling of security, it might be convenient if a percentage of tonnage assigned to different categories of certain types of vessels might be allowed to be transferred to certain other types, but His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom does not favour a general transfer. For the classes of capital ships, aircraft carriers and submarines there should be no transfer. Within the cruiser category it is proposed that transfer should be permitted out of the 8-inch class into the 6-inch class on a percentage to be arranged, an agreed evaluating factor being employed for such transfer. The object of this arrangement is to take account of the special needs of countries requiring a larger proportion of cruisers of a small type.

(3) As regards small cruisers and destroyers, it is probable that some nations with smaller navies may find a rigid division into these categories unworkable. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom will be prepared to consider a transfer of tonnage between these categories to take account of the special needs of the Powers in question.

(4) Turning to the question of the size and number of capital ships, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that the limit of numbers fixed by the Washington Treaty should be reached within eighteen months of the ratification of the Treaty arrived at by the London Naval Conference instead of in 1936; that no replacement of existing ships should take place before the next Conference in 1935, and that, in the meantime, the whole question of capital ships, their number, size and gun calibre, should be the subject of negotiation between the Powers which have built them. Without disturbing the Washington equilibrium and, therefore, security, the Government will press for reduction. The British Admiralty have informed the Government that it would favour a reduction in the size from 35,000 tons to 25,000 tons and of guns from 16-inch to 12-inch, together with a lengthening of the age from twenty to twenty-six years. The Government invites an exchange of views upon this subject before the Conferences disperses. As regards no other category of ships is there a better opportunity of meeting peace requirements or of effecting economies.

In the opinion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom the battleship, in view of its tremendous size and cost, is of doubtful utility and the Government would wish to see an agreement by which the battleship would in due time disappear altogether from the fleets of the world.

(5) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom considers that the evolution of the aircraft carrier both in tonnage and calibre of guns should be limited, and that ships of 10,000 tons and under should be included in the total tonnage assigned to the class. The Government proposes a total tonnage of, say, 100,000 for the British and United States navies as compared with a total tonnage of 135,000 under the Washington Treaty, and an adjustment of that assigned to other nations on the Washington Treaty ratios; that the maximum size should not exceed 25,000 tons and the age be lengthened from twenty to twenty-six years.

(6) The conversations of last summer between the Governments of the United States and Great Britain turned almost exclusively upon cruisers, and underlying them was the assumption that these should be grouped in one category subdivided into those carrying 8-inch guns and those carrying 6-inch guns and under. The negotiations were further conducted on the assumption that the requirements of the British Commonwealth would consist of fifty cruisers with a total tonnage of 339,000. A final arrangement will depend on the decisions of this Conference as regards limitation in size of units. The Government proposes that a general agreement should not change the tonnage limit of 8-inch

cruisers provided for in the Washington Treaty, but fix that of the smaller vessels at about 6,000 or 7,000 tons, with a further agreement that only a fixed proportion of the ships in that class should be built up to that limit. It also proposes to fix the life of cruisers at twenty years.

(7) The size and total tonnage of the destroyer class must largely depend on the size and tonnage of the submarine class. The Government proposes that the limit of size should be for leaders 1,850 tons with 5-inch guns (maximum) and 1,500 tons for destroyers, also with 5-inch guns (maximum). Its present building program will ultimately consume 200,000 tons, but this can be reduced if the submarine programs of other Powers are similarly reduced.

(8) His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes the abolition of the submarine. The argument that this arm is one solely of defence has been destroyed by the experiences of the late War. In war conditions it is an arm of attack, carrying offence into new fields and extending war fronts. If an agreement upon this is impossible, the Government will put forward proposals limiting submarines rigidly to defence requirements in numbers and size. Its position during the negotiations on this arm will be to obtain the lowest possible limits. It will also propose to revive the agreement signed at Washington on the 6th February, 1922, but not fully ratified by the signatory Powers, to regulate the attack of merchant ships by submarines in accordance with the rules and practice set forth in the treaty.

(9) Below this there will be types of auxiliary vessels, used for purposes ancillary to fleets which do not strictly speaking enter into fleet strengths. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom proposes that they should be specified and that each Government should agree to publish each year lists of such vessels with their individual tonnage in commission or actually building.

Memorandum Setting Forth the Position of the Italian Delegation at the London Naval Conference.

FEBRUARY 19, 1930.

I. The Italian Delegation confirm their previous statements. They consider that armaments should be exclusively defensive, and should, therefore, be reduced to the lowest possible level. If the Conference should not lead to agreements determining the ratios of strength of the several navies and lowering the level of naval armaments, it will fail in its purpose, and the hopes it has raised will be disappointed.

Armament levels and ratios are the basis of the Washington Treaty, and were the object of the negotiations preceding and preparatory to the present Conference. From the outset the Italian Delegation called the attention of the other Delegations to these two points, which they consider not only essential to the ends of the Conference, but which are also intimately connected with the determination of the methods of limitation to be adopted. The Italian Delegation note with satisfaction that the Conference is now taking these points into consideration. With reference thereto, the Italian Delegation wish to restate that Italy is prepared "*a priori*" to accept as limit for her armaments any figure, no matter how low, provided it be not exceeded by any other Continental European Power.

Italy's geographical situation is particularly unfavourable. She has not the advantage of an ocean frontier; she is dependent for her very existence on supplies, three-fourths of which are conveyed from overseas along vulnerable trade routes, dominated at short distance by naval bases of various Powers. Moreover, Italy possesses no extra-Mediterranean naval bases, a fact which

renders the task of protecting her merchant shipping on the high seas particularly arduous. Italy's problem is that of ensuring her existence, and not only that of safeguarding distant territories subject to her sovereignty or influence. Moreover, Italy, as signatory of the Treaty of Locarno, has incurred, together with Great Britain, special international commitments to guarantee the peace of continental Europe.

Notwithstanding her greater and special defence needs, Italy is prepared to accept the self limitation of her right to arm, and to reduce her armaments to any figure, however low, provided it be not exceeded by any European Continental Power.

She strongly advocates reduction of naval armaments, because, as a member of the League of Nations, and as one of the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact, Italy considers such a reduction as the natural outcome of those Treaties. It is by a reduction of armaments that nations can show the value they attach to the aforesaid treaties and prove their loyalty to the pledge they have given. The idea of an armed conflict with any Power, whether represented or not at the London Conference, is totally foreign to the established naval policy of Italy.

II. The Italian Delegation outline below the application of the principles above set forth to the stage now reached in our negotiations, dealing first with vessels covered by the Washington Treaty, and subsequently with the others. The suggestions that follow are naturally subject to the stipulation of a general agreement.

A.—VESSELS COVERED BY THE WASHINGTON TREATY

(i) *Capital Ships.*

The Washington Treaty fixed the following ratios and total tonnages for capital ships:—

	America	British Empire	Japan	France	Italy
Ratio.. . . .	5	5	3	1.67	1.67
Tonnage.. . . .	525,000	525,000	315,000	175,000	175,000

Under the Treaty, Italy was entitled to retain the 10 capital ships she had in 1922. She has voluntarily scrapped six without replacing them, remaining with four capital ships. Moreover, in October, 1928, she suggested that the signatory Powers should postpone, until 1936, building the capital ships which each of them is entitled to lay down during the period 1931-36.

The Italian Government—without prejudice to the agreements reached in Washington—maintain this suggestion, by which Italy would not lay down, for an agreed period, 105,000 out of the 175,000 tons assigned her, subject, of course, to the condition that the other signatory Powers accept the obligations resulting to each of them from the above suggestion.

Moreover, should the other Powers concur, Italy is prepared to examine favourably the abolition of capital ships.

(ii) *Aircraft Carriers*

	America	British Empire	Japan	France	Italy
Ratio.. . . .	5	5	3	2.22	2.22
Tonnage.. . . .	135,000	135,000	81,000	60,000	60,000

Under the Washington Treaty, Italy is entitled, here and now, to build up to the above figure of 60,000 tons. The Italian Delegation are, however, prepared to undertake not to exceed the aircraft carrier tonnage actually possessed at any given time by the strongest continental Power of Europe.

B.—VESSELS NOT COVERED BY THE WASHINGTON TREATY

The Italian Delegation are prepared to undertake not to exceed the global tonnage of war vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty actually possessed at any given time by the strongest European Continental Power. They are, likewise, prepared to agree not to exceed the total tonnage of submarines actually possessed at any given time by such a Power.

The above undertakings exclude the possibility that Italy should, at any time, exceed the armaments of the strongest European Continental Power. Moreover, they afford the best guarantee that Italy, far from standing in the way of further reduction of armaments, will, on the contrary, be instrumental thereto.

The Italian Delegation do not exclude the possibility that they might consent to more extensive methods of limitation, should the Conference agree to an actual reduction based on agreed ratios of strength. In the meantime, they maintain the suggestion, made at Geneva in April, 1927, to the effect that Italy is prepared to notify, six months at least before laying down the keel, the principal dimensions of the hull and the characteristics of the main armament of each ship to be built, provided the other Powers are willing to give a like undertaking.

With special reference to submarines, the Italian Delegation recall their statement to the effect that Italy has no objection to their abolition if a substantial reduction of naval armaments be secured, covering the abolition of capital ships. The Italian Delegation trust that, in any case, the submarine tonnage will be reduced.

The following table shows the present naval strength of the three European Powers in vessels not covered by the Washington Treaty. This table gives the figures of all vessels laid down or completed, not exceeding the agreed age limits of 20 years for cruisers, 16 for destroyers, and 13 for submarines.

Cruisers carrying 8-inch guns.

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed..	11	110,000	3	30,000	2	20,000
Building..	4	36,800	3	30,000	4	40,000
Total..	15	146,800	6	60,000	6	60,000

Other cruisers carrying a gun above 6-inch.

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed..	4	39,426	1	13,830*	2	20,940*

Cruisers carrying a gun of 6-inch and below.

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed..	39	177,685	7	41,870*	7	28,900*
Building..	—	—	—	—	6	29,604
Total..	39	177,685	7	41,870	13	58,504

Leaders and destroyers.

	British Empire		France		Italy	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed..	150	157,585	60	70,738	78	73,814
Building..	20	26,786	21	44,867	11	14,588
Total..	170	184,371	81	115,605	89	88,402

* For vessels completed prior to 1922 normal displacement is given instead of standard displacement—displacement in all cases in English tons.

Grand Total of Cruisers and Destroyers.

	<i>British Empire</i>		<i>France</i>		<i>Italy</i>	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed and building.. . .	228	548,282	95	231,305	110	227,846

	<i>Submarines.</i> <i>British Empire</i>		<i>France</i>		<i>Italy</i>	
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons
Completed..	53	45,534	44	31,984	43	27,263
Building..	10	14,750	47	49,783	14	9,825
Total..	63	60,284	91	81,767	57	37,088

Statement Setting Forth the Attitude of the Japanese Delegation in the London Naval Conference, February 13, 1930.

It is the belief of the Japanese Delegation that the London Naval Conference has been convened in response to the universal yearning of mankind for the establishment of an enduring peace. Japan is determined to contribute her full share in bringing about an all-round reduction in the naval weapons of war to the end that human happiness may be increased and the financial burden of the peoples may be lightened.

In view, however, of the relativity of naval strengths against one another, Japan desires to maintain such force as will ensure safety and security of the nation—a force necessary for her national defence in the Far Eastern waters, whose tranquility constitutes her primary concern.

The attitude of the Japanese Delegation, predicated upon these considerations, may be outlined as follows:

Method of Limitation

Too strict an application of either of the principles of global tonnage or of division into categories would not be suitable for arriving at an agreement among the Powers concerned. The Japanese Delegation is in favour of a formula which would harmonize the two extremes, allowing transfers in certain categories.

Capital Ships

The Japanese Delegation is ready to agree not to lay down any capital ships until 1936.

It also deems it desirable that an agreement should be reached so as to reduce the size of capital ships to 25,000 tons from 35,000 tons stipulated in the Washington Treaty. The maximum gun calibre should be reduced to 14 inches. Japan advocates the lengthening of the age limit from 20 to 26 years.

Aircraft Carriers

The provisions for the limitation of aircraft carriers in the Washington Treaty should be extended to those of less than 10,000 tons. The age limit for aircraft carriers of more than 10,000 tons should be lengthened from 20 to 26 years, and for those of lesser types shall be set at 20 years.

Auxiliary Craft

The Japanese Delegation considers it necessary to hold, as has been repeatedly intimated, a strength in adequate proportion to that of the other Powers concerned. If, therefore, those Powers will see their way to reducing their strength, Japan is prepared to effect reduction to a proportionate degree.

(1) *Cruisers, Destroyers.*

Japan attaches special importance to 8-inch gun cruisers, and desires to maintain a minimum strength sufficient for national defence, taking into consideration the strengths held by other Powers.

The maximum individual tonnage for 6-inch gun cruisers should be 7,000 or 7,500 tons, and that for flotilla leaders and destroyers be adequately limited. It is necessary that the number of flotilla leaders be also limited. The age limit for cruisers should be set at 20 years and that for destroyers at 16 years.

(2) *Submarines.*

In view of the character of submarines, eminently adapted to defensive uses, and in view of peculiar geographical condition of Japan, consisting of many widely scattered islands, the Japanese Delegation is convinced of the necessity to retain this category of warcraft.

At the same time, Japan is willing to co-operate with the other Powers to regulate strictly the use of submarines against merchant marine.

As to the tonnage, Japan proposes to maintain her existing strength. The maximum size of submarines shall be limited, and their age limit set at 13 years.

Statement by the Japanese Delegation Issued at 10 p.m., on April 2, 1930

The Japanese Delegation has transmitted to the Government the compromise plan emerging from the informal conversations between the American, British and Japanese Delegations and has asked for their instructions. The reply from Tokyo arrived on April 1 and at a meeting of the three Delegations at St. James' Palace, at 3.15 p.m. on April 2, Mr. Reijiro Wakatsuki made a statement that the Japanese Government had accepted the plan with a few reservations to which sincere consideration by the American and British Delegations was requested. As to the details of such reservations further exchange of views would be made between the three Delegations to-morrow.

It is a fact that the subject matter of the negotiations being related to the question of national defence there have been difficulties in arriving at an understanding between the three Delegations but the Japanese Government have always approached the matter with a firm resolve to co-operate with the participating Powers to make the Conference a success out of their sincere desire to promote international peace and goodwill. And in view of the fact that the present plan has grown out of the spirit of accommodation and conciliation of the representatives of the Powers concerned, the Japanese Government have come to agree to make it the basis of the treaty to be concluded. In doing so the Japanese Government have also in mind the fact that the treaty to be concluded will be in force up to the end of 1936 and that as to the arrangement thereafter all nations concerned will be free to claim all that they deem necessary and Japan will naturally be in a position to maintain the claim which she considers to be necessary from the point of view of national defence as heretofore.

ANNEX I.

REPORTS OF THE FIRST COMMITTEE.

FIRST REPORT.

1. In accordance with the decision of the Third Plenary Session held at St. James's Palace, on Thursday, January 30th, 1930, at 10 a.m., the Committee has had under consideration the following resolution:—

“Resolved, that the questions of method and procedure included under the heading entitled ‘General Questions’ in the Agenda now under discussion by the Chiefs of Delegations, and including particularly the suggestions of the French and British Governments as to Limitation by global tonnage or by categories respectively and including methods of transfer suggested by the French Government, be referred to a Committee composed of representatives to be appointed by the Delegations represented in the Conference with directions to examine carefully the possibilities and probable effect of said methods with reference to the fleets of said respective nations and to report its views thereon to the Conference through the Chiefs of the respective Delegations.”

2. The French Delegation submitted to the First Committee a revised text (L.N.C. 10, attached as Appendix I) of the transactional proposal drawn up in 1927 by the French Delegation to the League of Nations. Before turning, in connection with paragraph 2. A of L.N.C. 10, to the essential question of the classification to be adopted, the Committee proceeded to a first reading of the preceding paragraphs of this proposal, the French Delegation providing such explanations of these paragraphs as were necessary for the information of the Committee.

It was understood that this examination would be of a preliminary nature, since neither form nor text could be regarded as adopted at this initial stage of the discussion.

Subject to this reservation, paragraph 1. A of L.N.C. 10 (limitation of total (Global) tonnage) did not give rise to any observation.

On the proposal of the French Delegation itself, the discussion of paragraphs 1. B and 1. C of L.N.C. 10 was adjourned until the maxima characteristics of capital ships had been placed under consideration.

In connection with paragraph 2. A of L.N.C. 10, the French Delegation explained their proposals for measures of public information, provided for in this paragraph, in contradistinction to the thesis of limitation by categories put forward in the draft United Kingdom resolution (L.N.C. 1st Committee, 1st Paper, attached as Appendix II).

Eventually a formula was arrived at, subject to the general reservations previously made by the Italian Delegation,* and was remitted to a Committee of Experts for drafting: this formula reads as follows:—

“That each Power represented at the present Conference shall indicate, after an exchange of views with the other Powers, how it will allocate its global figure.”

3. The Committee decided, at its 3rd Meeting, held on February 6th, 1930, to refer the following questions to a Committee of Experts for detailed consideration and report.

(a) The question of drafting a formula in relation to the compilation of Table II of the French Transactional Proposal in L.N.C. 10, which would reconcile the alternative methods of limitation by global tonnage and by categories.

* *Vide* statements made by the Italian Delegates at the 1st Plenary Meeting of the Conference, January 30th, 1930, and at the 1st Meeting of the 1st Committee on January 31st, 1930.

(b) The question of drawing up a table setting out the classification of tonnage.

(c) The question of special vessels and vessels not subject to limitation.

The Committee of Experts, having arrived at certain conclusions in regard to questions (a) and (b) above, has submitted to us the attached report (Appendix III), which we considered at our 4th Meeting, held on February 12th, 1930.

4. We are glad to be able to report that we have reached agreement on certain points put forward in this report; other points arose, however, which involved matters of high principle, and these we considered would be more appropriately dealt with by Heads of Delegations.

The question of special vessels and vessels not subject to limitation is still under consideration.

5. In order that Heads of Delegations may more readily appreciate the result of our discussions, we submit herewith as an Annex our observations on the Report of the Committee of Experts (Appendix III), dealing with the subject of each section of the Agenda in the order it appears in paragraph 1 of that Report.

6. The resolutions concerning submarines, forwarded to us after the 4th Plenary Session, have been remitted to the Committee of Experts for examination and report as early as possible.

Signed on behalf of the Committee,

A. V. ALEXANDER,
Chairman.

E. J. HODSOLL,
Secretary.
Secretariat-General,
St. James's Palace,
February 20th, 1930.

ANNEX

1. Item (a) *To draft the findings of the First Committee with a view to reconciling the alternative methods for the limitation of naval armaments by the system of global tonnage or by classification by categories, on the basis of the following formula:—*

"That each Power represented at the present Conference shall indicate, after an exchange of views with the other Powers how it will allocate its global figure."

It was agreed to accept the formula in item (a) above of the Agenda of the Report, in accordance with the recommendation in Paragraph 4 of First Report of the Committee of Experts (Appendix III).

2. Item (b) *As regards classification of tonnage, to draw up a table setting out the classification to be adopted in two columns or otherwise representing systems applicable to different groups of Powers.*

In regard to item (b) above of the Agenda, the Committee of Experts has accepted and submitted a form of table based on Table II of the revised French Transactional Proposal (L.N.C. 10), subject to observations as shown in the attached report, grouped under the following headings:—

- (a) Generally agreed observations.
- (b) Special observations.

The First Committee also accepted Table I (*see* First Report of Committee of Experts, Appendix III), which is submitted with the following comments on the observations of the Committee of Experts:—

(a) *Generally agreed observations.*

(i) *That the question of the maximum and minimum displacement for the 6-inch (155 mm.) cruiser sub-class, and of the maximum displacement of the destroyer class, should be reserved either for the First Committee or for discussion between Heads of Delegations.*

It was decided to refer the question dealt with in this sub-paragraph to Heads of Delegations without comment.

(ii) *That the question of special vessels, like that of exempt vessels, should be reserved for further examination by the Committee of Experts and that it remained to be decided whether or not the former should be included in the categories dealt with in Table II.*

We await the further report of the Committee of Experts, who have not yet had time to examine the question of special vessels and vessels not subject to limitation, before forwarding any observations.

(b) *Special observations.*

United States.

(i) *The United States Delegation feel that maximum displacement figures for 6-inch (155 mm.) gun cruisers should not enter into the classification proposed. As this question is reserved for the First Committee or for discussion between the Heads of Delegations, the dependent question of reducing the maximum individual displacement of 6-inch (155 mm.) cruisers should likewise be reserved.*

It was agreed to refer the question contained in this sub-paragraph to Heads of Delegations.

(ii) *The United States Delegation feel that percentages of transfer should preferably be shown at the bottom of Table II.*

It was agreed that no matter of principle was involved in the question of whether the percentages of transfer should be shown at the bottom of Table II or in some part of the Convention. We recommend, therefore, that this statement be inserted in what we consider to be the most convenient place—the framework of the Convention.

(iii) *The United States Delegation stated that the percentages of transfer to be agreed upon were necessarily related to acceptance of the figures in Table II. As already indicated, they prefer that blank percentages of transfer should be placed at the bottom of or annexed to Table II, to be submitted by this Committee to the First Committee.*

No remarks. (*See* (ii) above.)

France.

(i) *The French Delegation remarked that the question of transfers was not mentioned in the terms of reference for the Committee of Experts and remained to be dealt with, as a whole, by the First Committee.*

The principles of transfer to meet the situation and of previous notice of transfer were agreed to, subject to the observation of the United Kingdom Delegation, with which the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand Delegations are associated, that the actual measure of transfer can only be decided when actual figures are produced. As regards the principle of application of per-

centages of transfer, it was not considered possible to go further towards a decision at this Conference until figures were produced. The French Delegation observed that, in making proposals for the general convention in Geneva, it will be important for certain Powers to know, before they can frame their requests for transfer, what are the percentages of transfer to be permitted, and whether they will apply to the category from which tonnage is deducted, or to the category to which tonnage is added. They observed that the First Committee had not yet taken any decision on this point.

(ii) *While not objecting to insert percentages of transfer at the bottom of the Table in the Convention, they considered that the general regulations concerning transfers should be included in the Convention itself.*

Covered by remarks in (b) (ii) United States.

(iii) *They drew attention to the fact that the question of special vessels remained to be dealt with, and that it was only after that question had been discussed that it could be decided whether it was advisable to include those vessels in Table II or not.*

No remarks.

(iv) *They have no further observations to make at present since the separation between cruisers and destroyers stops before the column for France.*

No remarks.

Japan.

(i) *The Japanese Delegation believed it highly essential that every possible effort should be made to contrive a method of limitation applicable alike to all the Powers, instead of division into two groups.*

The United States, Commonwealth of Australia, French, United Kingdom and New Zealand Delegations are in agreement with the point made in this sub-paragraph, which these Delegations regard as the ideal to be kept before the Conference.

(ii) *The Japanese Delegation would be prepared to agree to a division between light cruisers and destroyers on the condition that transfer was permitted, the amount of such transfer to be decided on. (The United Kingdom and United States Delegations were in agreement with this point.)*

The United States Delegation observed that, while they have accepted the principle of transfer as a basis of negotiation in order to help to reach agreement, they have always favoured a division between the cruiser and destroyer classes, quite irrespective of the question of transfer.

The United Kingdom Delegation, with which are associated the Commonwealth of Australia and New Zealand Delegations, agreed also with this point of view.

(iii) *The Japanese Delegation attached great importance to maximum and minimum displacement for 6-inch (155 mm.) cruisers being stated; their suggestion being that the maximum figure should be between 7,000-7,500 tons and the minimum figure should be 2,500 tons.*

This is covered by the agreement to refer this subject to Heads of Delegations.

(iv) *The Japanese Delegation desired to associate themselves with the United Kingdom Delegation observations in Items (i) (ii), (iii), (iv), (v). In regard to the question of transfer, the view of the Japanese Delegation had been already expressed by their Chief Delegate.*

No remarks.

Commonwealth of Australia, United Kingdom and New Zealand.

(i) *Category limits are indicated only by gun calibres in Table II. It is thought that displacement figures should be included in the classification as well.*

We have had considerable discussion on the question of accepting the principle, put forward by the United Kingdom Delegation, that displacement figures should be included in the classification, in addition to gun calibres. It appears to us that any decision on this point is dependent on the actual figures proposed by each Delegation for the various categories, and, for the moment, we consider that this question should be reserved.

(ii) *It is regarded as important that each Power should show the number of 8-inch (203 mm.) cruisers it proposes to build.*

The proposal that each Power should show the number of 8-inch (203 mm.) cruisers which it proposes to build is, we think, dependent on the question of category tonnages and transfer; and, until these points have been decided, we recommend that be reserved.

(iii) *It is desired that the maximum displacement for 6-inch (155 mm.) cruisers should be reduced from the figure fixed for cruisers by the Washington Treaty.*

This is covered by the agreement to refer this subject to Heads of Delegations.

(iv) *With regard to the Destroyer Category in Table II, the United Kingdom Delegation desire to add a note to the following effect: "H.C.P. entering figures against the Destroyer Category engage not to employ more than . . . per cent. for the Flotilla Leader class." (The United States Delegation concurred in this observation, but stated that they would prefer this to appear as a note to Table II.)*

The United States and Japanese Delegations are in agreement with the substance of this sub-paragraph; the French and Italian Delegations are not concerned.

(v) *The United Kingdom acceptance of the modified version of Table II is dependent upon the figures at which the tonnage in these categories are ultimately fixed by the Powers in question.*

No remarks.

(vi) *In accepting the modified version of Table II, the United Kingdom Delegation desire to state they consider that transfer downwards should be permitted, on a scale to be arranged, from the 8-inch (203 mm.) to the 6-inch (155 mm.) cruisers, and that they are prepared to agree to a percentage transfer between destroyers and 6-inch (155 mm.) cruisers. They consider that no transfer should otherwise be permitted.*

Since we have reserved, for the time being, the question of percentages, the proposal in this sub-paragraph must also be reserved.

3. Special observation by the Italian Delegation.

The Italian Delegation recall their general reservations.

APPENDIX I

January 31, 1930.

FRENCH TRANSACTIONAL PROPOSAL.

The limitation of naval material deals with floating material. It consists of the following:—

1. Measures for limitation.
2. Measures for Public Information.
3. Regulations for replacements.

1. *Measures for limitation.*

A.—The limitation of floating material relates to the total (global) tonnage, that is to say, to the total of the individual displacement of all vessels susceptible of being used as fighting units, with the exception of those vessels which are specified as not being subject to limitation.

The maximum total tonnage (global) which no High Contracting Power shall exceed during the period of application of the Convention is fixed at.....tons.

Table I shows for each H.C.P. the total (global) tonnage which, taking into consideration the limit laid down in the preceding paragraph, and the present state of security, this H.C.P. undertakes not to exceed during the period of application of the Convention.

B.—The individual standard displacement for vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed.....tons.

C.—The calibre of the guns of vessels to be laid down after the entry into force of the Convention shall not exceed.....mms.

2. *Measures of Public Information.*

The limitations specified in paragraph 1 are supplemented by the following measures of public information:—

A.—Table II shows, by tonnage per class, the way in which each H.C.P. intends to distribute, during the period of application of the Convention, the total (global) tonnage which it has limited to the figure indicated, as far as it is concerned, in Table I. For each class, this tonnage corresponds to the figure which should not be exceeded, during the period of application of the Convention, by the total of the individual displacements of all the vessels at any one moment on active service, and which by their characteristics belong to the class in question. The classes mentioned above are specified as follows:—

Class A.—Vessels the individual standard displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons, or with guns of more than 8-inch (203 mm.) calibre.

Class B.—Light surface vessels with guns exceeding 6-inch (155 mm.) calibre.

Class C.—Light surface vessels with guns not exceeding 6-inch (155 mm.) calibre.

Class D.—Submarines.

Class E.—Aircraft Carriers.

Class F.—Special vessels (minelayers, training ships, aircraft transports, etc.).

B.—Within the limits of the total (global) tonnage shown in Table 1, and in the absence of more strict conditions resulting from special conventions to which it is or may become a party, each of the H.C.P.s may alter this distribution, subject to the two following conditions:—

- (1) The tonnages by class shown in Table II shall in no case be the object of an increase or subtraction of an amount exceeding the figures given in the annexed Table;
- (2) The amount of tonnage of one class which is to be transferred to another class shall be notified to the other H.C.P.s at least one year before the laying down of the ship or ships for the construction of which the transferred tonnage has been assigned.

C.—Each of the H.C.P.s shall notify within the month following the laying down of any vessel that is being built for its own account, the type and displacement of this vessel. This information shall be supplemented at the time that the vessel is launched by publication of the main characteristics of the armament of the vessel.

D.—Even should they not have been declared to be on active service, vessels still under construction shall be regarded as being on such service after the lapse of a period, dating from their laying down, of years in the case of Class A, of years in the case of Class B, etc.

TABLE I.—LIMITATION OF TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

H.C.P.	Total (global) Tonnage
United States of America.....	
British Empire.....	
France.....	
Italy.....	
Japan.....	

TABLE II.—DISTRIBUTION OF TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.

H.C.P.	(Vessels, the individual displacement of which exceeds 10,000 tons or armed with guns exceeding 8 in. (203 mm.) calibre)	Light Surface Vessels with Guns exceeding 6 in. 155 mm.)	Light Surface Vessels with Guns not exceeding 6 in. (155 mm.)	Submarines	Aircraft Carriers	Special Vessels (Mine-Layers, Training-Vessels, Seaplane Carriers, etc).
United States of America.....						
British Empire.....						
France.....						
Italy.....						
Japan.....						

APPENDIX II.

FIRST COMMITTEE.

METHOD OF LIMITATION OF NAVAL ARMAMENT.

DRAFT RESOLUTION.

Outlining under Five Heads the Compromise proposed by the United Kingdom Delegation.

The Committee, having listened to the proposals put forward by the various Delegations for the limitation of naval armament by the method either of "global tonnage" or of classification by categories, and having carefully examined the transactional proposal circulated by the French Delegation, resolves as follows:—

That the classification of combatant craft shall be effected on the following basis:—

(1) Each Power shall indicate the figures of global tonnage it will not exceed during the period covered by the agreement.

(2) These global figures shall be allocated in the case of each Power on an agreed basis to the following categories:—

- (a) Capital ships.
- (b) Aircraft carriers.
- (c) Cruisers in two types—
 - (i) Carrying a gun above 6-inch.
 - (ii) Carrying a gun 6-inch and below.
- (d) Destroyers.
- (e) Submarines (if retained).

(3) As regards those of the above categories which were not included in the Washington Treaty of 1922 the maximum displacement and gun calibre limits shall be as follows:—

Category (c) (i):

Cruisers carrying a gun above 6-inch.
 Maximum displacement, 10,000 tons.
 Maximum calibre, 8-inch.

Category (c) (ii):

Cruisers carrying a gun 6-inch and below.
 Maximum calibre, 6-inch.
 Maximum displacement to be subject of agreement.

Category (d):

Destroyers: Maximum displacement 1,850 tons for leaders, 1,500 tons for destroyers; maximum calibre, 5-inch.
 (As provisionally agreed at the Tripartite Naval Conference, 1927.)

Category (e):

Submarines (if retained): Maximum displacement 1,800; maximum calibre, 5-inch.
 (As provisionally agreed at the Tripartite Naval Conference, 1927.)

(4) Within Category (c) in paragraph (2) above, transfer shall be permitted from (c) (i) to (c) (ii) on a percentage to be arranged, an agreed evaluating factor being employed for such transfer.

(5) A special provision shall be made to meet the needs of certain European Powers to whom the acceptance of the 1,850-ton limit for destroyer leaders would offer particular difficulties. This shall be done by according a faculty of transfer (up or down) of an agreed percentage of tonnage between Category (c) (ii) (6-inch cruiser type) and Category (d) (destroyers); the extent of such percentage shall be considered with reference to the figures at which the tonnage in these Categories for the Powers in question are ultimately fixed.

APPENDIX III.

FIRST REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS.

1. In accordance with the decision of the First Committee at the Meeting held at 3 p.m. on the 6th February, 1930, the Committee of Experts has held three meetings, on the 7th, 8th and 10th February, to consider, in accordance with its terms of reference, the following Agenda:—

(a.) To draft the findings of the First Committee with a view to reconciling the alternative methods for the limitation of Naval armaments by the system of global tonnage or by classification by categories, on the basis of the following formula:—

“That each Power represented at the present Conference shall indicate, after an exchange of views with the other Powers, how it will allocate its global figure.”

(b.) As regards classification of tonnage, to draw up a table setting out the classification to be adopted in two columns or otherwise representing systems applicable to different groups of Powers.

(c.) To report on the question of special vessels and vessels not subject to limitation.

2. The first Report on items (a) and (b) is forwarded to facilitate the work of the First Committee: a further report on item (c) will be rendered on completion of the discussion.

3. A list of the representatives of the various Delegations who attended the meetings of the Committee is attached as Annex II.

4. It was agreed to accept, without further discussion, the formula of item (a) of the Agenda. It was observed by the French Delegation that this formula could be easily inserted in paragraph IIA of the French transactional proposals.

5. As regards (b), the attached table, Annex I, proposed by the French Delegation and modified by the United Kingdom Delegation, was agreed to subject to the following observations:—

(a) *Generally Agreed Observations.*

(i) That the question of the maximum and minimum displacement for the 6-inch cruiser sub-class, and of the maximum displacement of the destroyer class, should be reserved either for the First Committee or for discussion between Heads of Delegations.

(ii) That the question of special vessels, like that of exempt vessels, should be reserved for further examination by the Committee of Experts and that it remained to be decided whether or not the former should be included in the categories dealt with in Table II.

(b) Special Observations.

United States.

(i.) The United States Delegation feel that maximum displacement figures for 6-inch gun cruisers should not enter into the classification proposed. As this question is reserved for the First Committee or for discussion between Heads of Delegations, the dependent question of reducing the maximum individual displacement of 6-inch cruisers should likewise be reserved.

(ii.) The United States Delegation feel that percentages of transfer should preferably be shown at the bottom of Table II.

(iii.) The United States Delegation stated that the percentages of transfer to be agreed upon were necessarily related to acceptance of the figures in Table II. As already indicated, they prefer that blank percentages of transfer should be placed at the bottom of or annexed to Table II, to be submitted by this sub-Committee to the First Committee.

France.

(i.) The French Delegation remarked that the question of transfers was not mentioned in the terms of reference for the Committee of Experts and remained to be dealt with, as a whole, by the First Committee.

(ii.) While not objecting to insert percentages of transfer at the bottom of the Table in the Convention, they considered that the general regulations concerning transfers should be included in the Convention itself.

(iii.) They drew attention to the fact that the question of special vessels remained to be dealt with, and that it was only after that question had been discussed that it could be decided whether it was advisable to include those vessels in Table II or not.

(iv.) They have no further observations to make at present since the separation between cruisers and destroyers to make at present since the separation between cruisers and destroyers stops before the column for France.

Japan.

(i.) The Japanese Delegation believe it highly essential that every possible effort should be made to contrive a method of limitation applicable alike to all the Powers, instead of division into two groups.

(ii.) The Japanese Delegation would be prepared to agree to a division between light cruisers and destroyers on the condition that transfer is permitted, the amount of such transfer to be decided on. (The United Kingdom and United States Delegations were in agreement with this point.)

(iii.) The Japanese Delegation attach great importance to maximum and minimum displacement for 6-inch cruisers being stated; their suggestion being that the maximum figure should be between 7,000-7,500 tons and the minimum figure should be 2,500 tons.

(iv.) The Japanese Delegation desire to associate themselves with the United Kingdom Delegation observations in Items (i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v). In regard to the question of transfer, the view of the Japanese Delegation has been already expressed by their Chief Delegate.

United Kingdom.

(i.) Category limits are indicated only by gun calibres in Table II. It is thought that displacement figures should be included in the classification as well.

(ii.) It is regarded as important that each Power should show the number of 8-inch cruisers it proposes to build.

(iii.) It is desired that the maximum displacement for 6-inch cruisers should be reduced from the figure fixed for cruisers by the Washington Treaty.

(iv.) With regard to the Destroyer Category on Table II, the United Kingdom Delegation desire to add a note to the following effect: "H.C.P. entering figures against the Destroyer category engage not to employ more than per cent, for the Flotilla Leader class." (The United States Delegation concurred in this observation, but stated that they would prefer this to appear as a note to Table II.)

(v.) The United Kingdom acceptance of the modified version of Table II is dependent upon the figures at which the tonnage in these categories are ultimately fixed by the Powers in question.

(vi.) In accepting the modified version of Table II, the United Kingdom Delegation desire to state they consider that transfer downwards should be permitted, on a scale to be arranged, from the 8-inch to the 6-inch cruisers, and that they are prepared to agree to a percentage transfer between destroyers and 6-inch cruisers. They consider that no transfer should otherwise be permitted.

6. The Italian Delegation stated that they had followed the discussions with great interest, but referring to the general reservation previously made, said that they had no particular remarks to make at the present stage.

Signed on behalf of the Committee,

R. L. CRAIGIE, *Chairman*.

E. J. HODSOLL, *Secretary*.

February 10, 1930.

ANNEX I TO APPENDIX III

TABLE II.—DISTRIBUTION OF THE TOTAL (GLOBAL) TONNAGE.
(French Proposal as Revised by the United Kingdom Delegation).

Categories	British Empire	U.S.A.	Japan	France	Italy	X	Y	Z
A. Capital ships.....								
B. Aircraft carriers.....								
C. Cruisers— (a) With guns of more than 6-inch (155 mm.) calibre.								
(b) With guns of 6-inch (155mm.) calibre or less.								
D. Destroyers.....								
E. Submarines.....								

THIRD REPORT.

1. At the Fourth Plenary Session of the Conference, held on February 11th, 1930, the following two resolutions, formulated by the United States and French Delegations respectively, were passed to the First Committee for examination and report:—

(a) *United States Delegation Resolution.*

Resolved: "That a committee should be appointed to study and report to the Conference as to the possibility of agreement on the following questions:—

- I. The abolition of the submarine;
- II. Regulation of the use of the submarine through subjecting it to the rules of war governing the use of surface craft;
- III. Regulation of the unit size of submarines."

(b) *French Delegation Resolution.*

" . . . committee shall be appointed to prepare an agreement, open for signature to all Naval Powers, forbidding submarines to act towards merchant ships otherwise than in strict conformity with the rules, either present or future, to be observed by surface warships."

2. The First Committee, at their fourth meeting, held on February 12th, 1930, referred these two resolutions to the Committee of Experts, who, for the sake of convenience, divided them into three parts:—

Part 1. The question of the abolition of the submarine.

Part 2. The legal aspect of submarine warfare.

Part 3. The question of the limitation of the unit size of submarines.

3. It was subsequently found more convenient to confine the Committee of Experts to the consideration of Parts 1 and 3 of the above agenda, and to delegate the examination of Part 2 to a Committee of Jurists.

4. At the seventh meeting of the First Committee, held on April 8th, 1930, the reports of both the Committee of Experts and the Committee of Jurists were considered, and it has been possible, therefore, to submit a composite report on the two resolutions transmitted by the Fourth Plenary Session.

5. The recommendations of the First Committee, under the headings given in paragraph 2 above, are attached as an Annex.

Signed on behalf of the Committee.

A. V. ALEXANDER,
Chairman.

Secretariat-General,
St. James's Palace,
12th April, 1930.

ANNEX

Part 1.—*The Question of the Abolition of the Submarine.*

1. The Committee of Experts unanimously agreed that this was a question with which they were unable to deal owing to its essentially political character; they made no comments on it in consequence. (L.N.C. 1st Committee Paper No. 12, Part 1, paragraphs 6-8.) (Appendix I.)

2. The matter was raised again in the First Committee at the seventh meeting, but it was not found possible to reach agreement, and the position of the various Delegations remained as stated at the Fourth Plenary Session of the Conference.

3. The First Committee has to report, accordingly, that no agreement has been reached which would render possible the abolition of the submarine.

Part 2.—*The Legal Aspect of Submarine Warfare.*

4. The Committee of Jurists unanimously recommended the acceptance, as established rules of International Law, of the declaration given in paragraph 5 below; their report is attached as Appendix II.

5. This declaration, which was unanimously accepted by the First Committee with the recommendation that a ratification clause should be added, is as follows:—

“The undersigned, duly authorized to that effect on behalf of their respective Governments, hereby make the following declaration:—

The following are accepted as established Rules of International Law:—

(i) In their action with regard to merchant ships, submarines must conform to the Rules of International Law to which surface war vessels are subject.

(ii) In particular, except in the case of persistent refusal to stop on being duly summoned, or of active resistance to visit or search, a warship, whether surface vessel or submarine, may not sink or render incapable of navigation a merchant vessel without having first placed the passengers, crew and ship's papers in a place of safety. For this purpose the ship's boats are not regarded as a place of safety unless the safety of the passengers and crew is assured, in the existing sea and weather conditions, by the proximity of land, or the presence of another vessel which is in a position to take them on board.

“The Signatory Governments invite all other Governments to express their assent to the above rules by means of a notification addressed to the Government of.....”

6. The First Committee unanimously recommend, therefore, the acceptance of the Committee of Jurists' declaration with the addition of a ratification clause.

Part 3.—*The Question of the Limitation of the Unit Size of Submarines.*

7. The Committee of Experts divided this subject into two sections; (i) the limitation of the unit size of submarines, and (ii) the limitation of the calibre of guns of submarines (Appendix II).^{*} They reported that they had been unable to achieve agreement on either of these questions. (L.N.C., 1st Committee, Paper No. 12, Part 3, paragraphs 11-24.) From their report it was apparent that, actually, the measure of disagreement was not large and the First Committee is able to record that it has been found possible to bridge the gap and render a unanimous recommendation.

8. In regard to the unit size of submarines, the Committee of Experts had arrived at a point where there was general agreement that the maximum unit displacement figure should be fixed at 2,000 tons; they had been unable, however, to achieve unanimity in regard to the request of the French Delegation that France should be allowed to maintain a limited number of submarines of a maximum displacement of 3,000 tons, which she stated that she required especially for the protection of her Colonial Empire and its extended lines of communication.

^{*} Not attached.

9. The First Committee, after some discussion, unanimously recommend that the following compromise be accepted in regard to the maximum unit displacement of submarines:—

(a) That the maximum unit displacement of submarines be fixed at a figure of 2,000 tons.

(b) That, as an exception to the general rule given in (a) above, each of the Powers represented at the present Conference may be permitted to maintain not more than three submarines of a maximum unit displacement of 2,800 tons. (The French Delegation drew attention to the fact that the first of the submarines which France would propose to maintain under this agreement displaced 2,880 tons and had already been launched; it was unanimously agreed that this submarine might be maintained by France without prejudice to the retention of the limit of 2,800 tons for the remaining two vessels.)

(c) That the three large submarines allowed to each Power under this agreement must be included in the total tonnage allotted to the submarine category and are not to constitute any addition to this total.

(d) That this agreement should apply for the period covered by the present Convention.

10. In regard to the maximum calibre of guns to be mounted in submarines, the Committee of Experts reported that, with the exception of the French Delegation, all other Delegations had agreed to accept a limit of 5-inch (130 mm.); the French Delegation, while pressing for a limit of 6·1 inch (155 mm.), had stated that they would be prepared to reconsider this point when the question of the large submarines required by them had been settled.

11. The First Committee is glad to report that in this case, also, unanimous agreement has been reached on the following basis:—

(a) That the maximum calibre of a gun to be mounted in a submarine shall not exceed 5-inch (130 mm.).

(b) That, as a special exception to the general rule given in (a) above, each of the Powers represented at the present Conference may be permitted to increase this calibre to 6·1-inch (155 mm.) in respect only of the three submarines exceeding the general limit of 2,000 tons unit displacement which each Power is permitted to have under paragraph 9 (b), (c) and (d) above. (France is permitted to retain the gun of 8-inch (203 mm.) already mounted on the large submarine of 2,880 tons.)

12. The First Committee unanimously recommend, therefore, that:—

(a) The maximum unit displacement of submarines be 2,000 tons, and that the maximum gun calibre shall not exceed 5-inch (130 mm.).

(b) As a special exception to the above general rule, each Power represented at the present Conference be permitted to maintain not more than three submarines of a maximum unit displacement of 2,800 tons, in which vessels the gun shall not exceed 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre; this agreement to be for the duration of the present Convention and subject to the condition that no increase is thereby permitted to the total tonnage allotted to the submarine category. (France is allowed to retain one submarine, out of the three permitted, which has been already launched, having a displacement of 2,880 tons, in which the gun already mounted is of 8-inch (203 mm.) calibre.)

SUMMARY

13. The recommendations of the First Committee, as set out in the above report, may be summarized as follows:—

(a) That it has not been found possible to secure agreement to abolish the submarine.

(b) That the declaration regarding the legal aspect of submarine warfare should be accepted in the form set out in paragraph 5 of Part 2 of this report, with the addition of a ratification clause.

(c) That the maximum unit displacement of submarines should be 2,000 tons, and that no gun should be mounted exceeding 5-inch (130 mm.) calibre.

(d) That as a special exception to (c) above, each of the Powers represented at the present Conference be permitted to maintain not more than three submarines of a maximum unit displacement of 2,800 tons, in which vessels the gun shall not exceed 6·1-inch (155 mm.) calibre; this agreement to be for the duration of the present Convention and subject to the condition that no increase is thereby permitted to the total tonnage allotted to the submarine category. (France is allowed to retain one submarine out of the three allowed, which has been already launched, having a displacement of 2,880 tons, in which the gun already mounted is of 8-inch (203 mm.) calibre.)

ANNEX J.

SPEECH OF THE HON. PHILIPPE ROY AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE, APRIL 22.

Mr. Chairman and Gentlemen: It is a great honour, indeed, for me to be present at this closing session of the London Naval Conference, but I confess that I feel, in some measure, an usurper. Colonel Ralston, who took part in nearly all the deliberations with such interest and, I believe, helpfulness, has had to return to Canada. He asked me to express to you, his colleagues and friends, his very deep regret that he cannot be at the parting—as he was at the coming together—in order to thank you himself for the many marks of cordial and kindly co-operation which you gave him. May I be allowed to add, in his name and in mine, a grateful reference to the wholehearted and efficient help rendered by the untiring and devoted staff of the Secretariat, under the able guidance of Sir Maurice Hankey. I trust that, in my words, you will find the echo of Colonel Ralston's forceful voice; in some cases, I have used not only the substance of his ideas, but, also, the form in which he clothed them during the conversations I had with him before he left.

I wish to express what I know to be in the minds of all of us, profound admiration and esteem for the statesman who took the initiative of convening this Conference and who, amid the many cares of his high office in this country, has carried the burden of responsibilities as Chairman of this great mission; in the many difficulties which had to be faced, he has set for us an example of tact, of patience and of understanding.

That this Conference has succeeded there can be no doubt. Its success may be demonstrated, not only in figures—of dollars and of ships—but also in the encouragement given to the praiseworthy habit of consultation between nations. But, perhaps, the most far-reaching result is the awakening of the world to the fact that an informed and active public opinion is necessary to achieve disarmament. I am glad to say that such opinion is growing steadily

in Canada, where it is fostered and strengthened, because it has been found possible not only to foreswear war, but to set up with our friends to the South effective machinery to take its place. Reduction will receive a tremendous impetus when countries, in estimating security, will reckon agreements as effective substitutes for force, and will reduce tonnage because they have adopted devices for settling differences by discussion and reason. The experience of Canada with such methods has been reassuring; she believes that the hope for peace lies in extending the principle of consultation and arbitration, and she offers her experience of a joint international tribunal as evidence that such agencies are practical and effective.

I need hardly say, Gentlemen, that the friendly and complete agreement reached by the Powers which happen to be our nearest neighbours gives the highest satisfaction to Canada. We shall follow, with deep interest, the conversations which are to ensue with the Continental Nations; our people are deeply concerned about a favourable solution. Gentlemen, it is with this expression of goodwill and of faith that we shall sign the Treaty. The results which have been obtained are great, and the future will show that our optimism is fully justified.

ANNEX K.

SPEECH OF THE RIGHT HONOURABLE J. RAMSAY MACDONALD AT THE CLOSING SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE, APRIL 22.

Gentlemen, we have now gone as far as we can at present, and we are met together this morning to gather together our points of agreement and embody them in a treaty. Compared with Washington or Geneva we have progressed far; but we have still some progress to make. This is but another stage, and the work will have to be continued. We must go on attacking the problems which have baffled us. Upon one thing we can congratulate ourselves. Everyone who has taken part in this Conference knows how, again and again, a mistaken word or awkward handling could have created troubled situations which would not have been allayed speedily, and yet, we part to-day in a spirit of active goodwill, determined to make this a beginning, and to use every means which offers itself to make a Five-Power Treaty a reality. The Conference has done a great work. We have secured a Three-Power Agreement on building programmes—no mean or unimportant achievement. This, with other points embodied in the Treaty, has repeatedly defied solution and has brought conference after conference to naught. On the apparently simple matter of settling the method by which the relative strengths of navies may be agreed, hitherto, there have been insoluble differences of opinion.

These have gone. We have stopped the replacement of battleships and reduced their numbers. We have limited the tonnage of auxiliary craft. We have shown how the equipment, the building and the replacement of fleets can be brought within the realm of international order. We have proved how, when the world likes, the menace of arms can be removed by treaties regulating their development. True the work has been but partially done, but all great advances of this kind must be in stages, and we have gone much further than has as yet been possible. Figures have been published already showing the reductions in building and savings in cost which result from our negotiations, but I doubt if the public have yet appreciated how much in this respect has been effected. There are definite building programmes arranged as well as ships actually built, and a reduction in these programmes is almost as valuable as a scrapping of ships. We found the world's navies at a point of serious and dangerous expansion. Competition had begun, nations were at the fatal moment of once again,

by a process of mental delusion, reducing their security against war by increasing their armaments. So long as that will-o'-the-wisp is followed, conferences like this must fail, or at any rate, can but partially succeed. We must just be content to go on strengthening the new mentality of peace and applying it, step by step, in further and further reductions.

The Treaty carries us to 1936, when further progress in the same direction ought to be possible. The British Government place a very high value on Paris Pacts and Treaties for the peaceful settlement of disputes, and they, therefore, made an offer to come to an agreement upon all-round reductions in naval strengths from battleships to submarines, in such a way as not to entail a loss of security upon any nation. Such an agreement has been come to between the United States, Japan and ourselves, but the European situation was harder to resolve. Until it is resolved and agreement is come to regarding it, every bond of limited scope must have the protection of a safeguarding clause such as that in the Treaty which we sign to-day. But I wish to say this about that clause. It is not put in as an easy way to get round the Treaty. I hope it will never be used, but if it has to be, that will only happen after every effort has been made to avoid it. Only when it is apparent that, owing to the ships built, building or definitely authorized by any Power or Powers, our naval position is so affected that it is impossible for this country to rest in peace of mind upon the figures embodied in Part III of this Treaty. Only then shall this protection clause be thought about.

The British Government are ready now, and always will be, to strive with might and main to prevent this arising, and we have every hope that, as a result of the conversations after the adjournment of this Conference, an understanding will be arrived at which will make any use of it absolutely unnecessary. I will appeal to the public opinion of Europe to range itself behind those who are to conduct these further negotiations so that, with as little delay as possible, they may terminate in agreements on limitation and reduction which can be fitted into the Treaty now open for signature. It cannot be said too often that no one nation can take the way to disarmament. That can be done only by international agreement. The way to disarmament is not easy. To pass resolutions about it is good, but, sooner or later, we have to face numbers of tons, classes of vessels, size of fleets, and somebody must undergo the tiresome drudgery of settling complicated technical details. It has been our lot for many weeks now to be engaged upon that essential, but somewhat uninspiring, task. That is the only work that will bring us to the end desired. We must be patient with each other so long as the quest for an agreement is being sincerely pursued. During these days, however, we have come to understand each other's difficulties, and, in this matter, understanding is the first stage of success. We have also become far more than fellow negotiators; we have become friends, and I believe we now, for the time being, go our several ways feeling that the business which has brought us together is of the highest international import and relates to a cause which we wish to continue to serve.

I have to thank you all for both forbearance and helpfulness. You have all, Delegates and Experts alike, conspired to make my work easy and to overlook and overcome my faults. The Americans, headed by Mr. Stimson, with their enthusiasm, have been delightful colleagues, and have helped us over many a difficulty. The Japanese, led by Mr. Wakatsuki, have been stout defenders of their national needs, and yet, loyal colleagues in the common cause which we have been trying to promote. The French, with M. Tardieu and M. Briand at their head, in the midst of political distractions which, for a time, unfortunately, deprived us of their presence, have given us unstinted assistance and, even though their circumstances have forbidden them to come to complete agreement as yet, they have displayed the very best evidence that they are, heart and soul, as ever, enlisted in the cause of peace, and that they

go from here only to continue negotiations, determined to bring them to a successful ending. The Italians, whose chief spokesman, Signor Grandi, is, unfortunately, unable to be with us owing to illness, have had a difficult part to play, and, though they were unable to engage in discussions upon actual figures, they have helped us in every other way, and they too, signing not a little of what has been done, go away determined to find ways which will ultimately produce an agreement between us all and join in the march forward towards European disarmament. Around the British Government has been ranged a body of independent representatives of the Dominions and India who, whilst guarding with jealous care their independent position, have shown a sleepless anxiety to maintain that unity and counsel which was necessary for general agreement. Nor must I omit to thank that fine body of Experts and Secretaries whose knowledge and experience have been at our disposal, and who, at all hours, have been at our service. To one and all, as Chairman of the Conference, I tender my most grateful thanks.

Gentlemen, I believe we have done a work that will follow us. I believe that the London Naval Conference of 1930 has laid foundation stones upon which others will build with thankful hearts, and that we can suspend our labours for the present and bid each other good-bye, carrying away with us not only a signed Treaty, but the most precious of all factors in international peace, sterling goodwill and mutual friendly understanding and respect.

ANNEX L.

MEMORANDUM OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS ON THE RESULTS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE FROM JANUARY 21 TO APRIL 15, 1930.

London, April 15, 1930.

In a memorandum on the position at the London Naval Conference, 1930, presented to Parliament on the 4th February last, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom took the view that if the strengths of national fleets were not to be a menace they must be the subject of international agreement, the purpose of which should be to maintain an equilibrium which should form the subject of agreements made from time to time by the Naval Powers. His Majesty's Government believed that, if such an agreed equilibrium could be established over a period of time, the sense of security of any Power would be increased, and one of the most fruitful sources of fear and friction would be removed. Meanwhile, Governments could be engaged in strengthening the foundations of peace and paving the way for further measures of disarmament.

Proposals for achieving the above were set out in the memorandum, and it will now be convenient to place before Parliament the measure of success which has been reached up to date at the London Naval Conference in giving effect to the aims of His Majesty's Government.

As regards capital ships, complete agreement has been reached between all the Powers represented at the Conference that they will lay down none of the replacement ships of 35,000 tons each which they were entitled to build, under the terms of the Washington Treaty, during the years 1931-36 inclusive. The British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan undertake to proceed at once with the reduction of their capital ships in numbers to 15, 15, 9 respectively instead of waiting until the expiration of the Washington Treaty. France and Italy only reserve to themselves the right of constructing additional ships from the replacement tonnage which has been avail-

able for such use between the signature of the Washington Treaty and the present day, but which has not actually been used up to date.

As regards aircraft carriers, His Majesty's Government have not been able to obtain at this conference a modification of the total tonnage and displacement limits laid down in the Washington Treaty. It was agreed that this matter should be left over until a conference in 1935, but meanwhile His Majesty's Government's proposal that aircraft carriers under 10,000 tons should be included in the aircraft carrier category has been generally agreed to, and the further provision has been added that the gun armament for these particular vessels should not exceed 6 inches in calibre, instead of 8 inches.

As regards other classes of vessels, it has not been possible yet to reach an agreement embracing all the Powers represented at the Conference. His Majesty's Government will continue conversations with France and Italy in the hope of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment.

Meanwhile complete agreement has been reached between the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan on:—

- (a) the category system of limitation of capital ships, aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines,
- (b) the figures within these categories, and
- (c) the question of transfer between 6-inch cruisers and destroyers.

The figures for the agreement for cruisers, destroyers and submarines as between the three Powers are as follows:—

British Commonwealth of Nations

8-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .	15 units	146,800
6-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .		192,200
Destroyers.. . . .		150,000
Submarines.. . . .		52,700
Total.. . . .		541,700

United States

8-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .	18 units	180,000
6-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .		143,500
Destroyers.. . . .		150,000
Submarines.. . . .		52,700
Total.. . . .		526,200

Japan

8-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .	12 units	108,400
6-inch-gun cruisers.. . . .		100,450
Destroyers.. . . .		105,500
Submarines.. . . .		52,700
Total.. . . .		367,050

The United States undertakes not to complete more than fifteen 8-inch-gun cruisers before 1935.

The United States has the option to rest on this figure and to make a corresponding increase in its 6-inch-gun cruisers from 143,500 to 189,000, in which case the total tonnage for the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations will amount to 541,700. If it does not choose to exercise this

option it undertakes that its 16th 8-inch-gun cruiser will be laid down in 1933, its 17th in 1934 and its 18th in 1935. In that event Japan will be free to advance a claim at the Conference in 1935 for an increase in its 8-inch tonnage.

This section of the treaty, which will apply to the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan, will contain a clause safeguarding our position in relation to the building programs of other Powers.

In addition to the above points affecting actual tonnage, a number of important decisions have been taken on the questions relating to the method of limiting and defining naval material of war. The rules which have been drawn up relate to the following subjects:—

The general principle of limitation (*i.e.*, a satisfactory compromise between the systems of global tonnage and limitation by categories); the definitions of the cruiser and destroyer; the unit size and armament of destroyers and submarines; the definition of exempt vessels, special vessels and aeroplane carriers; the rules for scrapping and replacement; the definition of displacement tonnage; and the prohibition of the construction of vessels which do not conform to Treaty limitations.

It has not been found possible to reach agreement on the abolition of the submarine, but as regards the three Powers a total submarine tonnage figure which shall apply equally to each of them has been arrived at, and His Majesty's Government has been able to insert a figure for destroyer tonnage which is appropriate if related to the three Signatory Powers, and is less by 50,000 tons than the figure of 200,000 tons referred to in the White Paper of 4th February last.

It must be noted, however, that the figure of 150,000 tons of destroyers for the British Commonwealth of Nations must be conditional on an agreed destroyer and submarine strength of the European Powers represented at the London Conference. This will be the subject of further negotiations with the Powers concerned.

Further, although the submarine remains as a combatant naval vessel, an important agreement has been reached by all five Powers strictly limiting its use, and ensuring its compliance to the rules generally recognized to be applicable to all surface vessels. This is not so drastic as the Washington instrument, but the latter treaty, though ratified by us, never received the requisite unanimous ratification.

The immediate financial saving resulting from the conference is the avoidance of expenditure for the replacement of battleships under the Washington Treaty. But for this agreement, before the end of 1936, Great Britain would, under the Washington Treaty, have completed five new 35,000-ton ships and would have had a further five appropriated for and under construction. This might have necessitated an expenditure in the region of £50,000,000 up to the end of 1936. Further, the financial saving involved in reducing at once to 15 capital ships is estimated at about £4,000,000.

As regards cruisers, destroyers and submarines, the United States, Japan and the British Commonwealth of Nations have overcome the difficulties which resulted in the failure of the Geneva Conference in 1927. The final British proposal at that conference was for a combined total tonnage of cruisers, destroyers and submarines, including over-age vessels, of 737,500 tons. The comparable total agreed upon to-day is 541,700 tons. On a conservative basis we have been saved a further expenditure in these classes of ships of some 13 million sterling.

Important as are these financial savings, a yet more important result of this first stage of the London Conference has been the elimination of competitive building in cruisers and auxiliary craft between the British Commonwealth of Nations, the United States and Japan, with all that this implies in the

mutual improvement of their political relations. The figures of the agreement between those Powers have been placed at a low level and it is the earnest hope of His Majesty's Government that during the next stage of the conference agreement may be reached with the French and Italian Governments at levels which will permit of their programs and tonnage figures being incorporated in the agreement already reached between the other Powers.

After the signature of the treaty the Conference will adjourn in order to give further time for negotiations between the French and Italian Governments, with a view to the settlement of difficulties which as yet prevent a complete agreement. These negotiations may be prolonged, and it is unnecessary that the Delegations from distant countries, which are not so immediately concerned, should remain in London while the conversations are proceeding; it is for this reason that an adjournment has been decided upon.

ANNEX M.

STATEMENT ISSUED ON APRIL 11, 1930, BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
ON THE RESULTS OF THE LONDON NAVAL CONFERENCE.

The President said:

"I am greatly pleased with the final success of the Naval Arms Conference in London and I have to-day telegraphed the delegation expressing my approval of the result achieved and my admiration for their patience and determination in an arduous and difficult negotiation. And I wish to congratulate the delegations of the other governments for their constructive and courageous action.

"The most vital feature of its great accomplishments for peace is the final abolition of competition in naval arms between the greatest naval powers and the burial of the fears and suspicions which have been the constant product of rival warship construction. It will be recalled that prior to the three-power conference at Geneva in 1927, which France and Italy felt obliged to decline attendance, there was naval competition in all craft except battleships with constant international friction. Consequently upon the failure of that conference the rival expansion received even new impulses and resulted in increased international suspicion and ill-will through the world and a steady drift to greatly increased navies.

"When I initiated this negotiation it was after a critical examination of the experience before and after the Geneva Conference and a determination that the causes of that failure could be met with adequate preparation and preliminary negotiation. At that time we realized, and have realized at all times since, that the particular setting of the continental nations, because of the inseparable importance of land armies in their bearing upon naval strength, together with the political agreements that reduction of such arms implied, made a five-power agreement extremely improbable, as the United States could not involve itself in such agreements. The French and Italian Governments have shown the utmost good will in this conference in endeavour, in the interest of world peace, to support the present solution just as far as they could do so, and they have joined the present agreement in important provisions.

"It is difficult to estimate the precise reductions in war craft tonnage which has been brought about by this agreement because of the factor of normal replacement and additional tonnage authorized but not yet constructed. Nine battleships are to be scrapped of a total of about 230,000 tons, the replacement of sixteen or seventeen others to be deferred for six years. The various navies in the agreement are to reduce some 300,000 to 400,000 tons of other categories in the next few years as they become obsolete—but some categories of some of

them must be increased in order to come up to the standards set. The net balance will be a very considerable decrease in the world's actual tonnage as it stands to-day.

"The economic importance of the accomplishment can best be measured in terms of the situation developed at the Geneva Conference. That conference broke down upon the feeling of the British representatives that it was necessary for them to create or maintain a navy of a total of nearly 1,500,000 tons. Their pre-war navy was much larger than this. The American delegates were not able to agree to this basis, as it implied such a huge amount of naval construction in the United States that it was hopeless to expect public support, and it meant a perpetually inferior navy.

"The British suggestions at Geneva were approximately:

1. Maintain the battleships as provided in the Washington Treaty of which the British Battle Fleet then stood at 606,000 tons, and the American Battle Fleet of 525,000 tons.

2. Aircraft carriers as in the Washington Treaty at a maximum of 135,000 tons.

3. A cruiser tonnage of about 450,000 tons in 70 cruisers.

4. Although actual figures were little discussed the conversations appear to have indicated a destroyer tonnage of about 225,000 to 250,000 tons, and a submarine tonnage of about 75,000 tons, or a total fleet of nearly 1,500,000 tons on a British basis, or 1,420,000 American basis owing to our inferiority in battleship tonnage through the Washington Arms Treaty.

"If this fleet had been adopted as the basis of parity, it would have cost the United States somewhere, upon different calculations, from \$1,400,000,000 to \$1,750,000,000 for replacements and new construction to attain it with greatly increased maintenance costs.

"The present agreement calls for parity of American and British fleets of approximately:

1. A battleship basis to each of us of about 460,000 tons, but no replacements for the next six years on either side.

2. Aircraft carriers as in the Washington Arms Treaty at a maximum of 135,000 tons.

3. A cruiser basis of 339,000 tons if the United States exercises the option of the same types as Great Britain, but, if the United States builds a larger ratio of the large cruisers, our tonnage would be 323,000. It represents a reduction of about 20 ships in the basis of the British cruiser fleet.

4. Destroyer tonnage of 150,000 tons and a submarine tonnage of 52,700 tons each.

That is, a total fleet basis of, roughly, about 1,136,000 tons (slightly less if we build the larger cruisers), as compared with about 1,500,000-ton British basis of the Geneva Conference, shows a reduction of about 364,000 tons below that basis to the United States and Great Britain and a proportional reduction to Japan. In bringing this about the British scrap four 8-inch gun cruisers and five battleships, while we scrap three battleships, thus bringing about parity in battleships which was not attained in the Washington agreement. The Japanese navy under the proposed agreement will amount to something near 800,000 tons. These results are to be arrived at by scrapping, by obsolescence and by construction in some categories prior to 1936 when a renewed conference is to take place.

"The cost to the United States of replacements and new construction during the next six years until the further conference will be (under various estimates) from \$550,000,000 to \$650,000,000 as compared to a sum, as I have said, of between \$1,400,000,000 to \$1,750,000,000 to attain parity on the Geneva basis. To this latter would need be added the additional cost of maintenance and operating which would make the saving upon the present basis as compared to the Geneva up to \$1,000,000,000 in the next six years.

"The savings are not alone to the United States but to Great Britain and Japan as well. The total savings to the world is perhaps \$2,500,000,000 below the Geneva basis to which the world was steadily drifting. This sum devoted to productive enterprise will be a great stimulus to world prosperity.

"There are no political undertakings of any kind in the present treaty except an agreement for the regulation of the conduct of submarines against merchant ships in time of war. The whole agreement is a great step in world peace and an assurance of American parity in naval strength."



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